



the famous principle of *De gustibus non est disputandum*.<sup>3</sup> Subjectivism and relativism barred such essential investigations in aesthetics as the analysis of ontological status of the work of art, of the aesthetic object and aesthetic value, or the analysis of the complex structure of aesthetic experience, not merely reduced to pleasure or the unpleasant.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, as subjectivism and relativism in aesthetic values resulted from psychological and epistemological analyses, the two tendencies entirely neglected ontological investigation on the theory of value. In the extreme form, this approach went as far to deny that scientific practice of aesthetics is possible.

The merit of phenomenology is that by discovering an entirely new plane of axiological investigation, it opened for aesthetics opportunities to investigate (by referring to direct ocularity) the qualitative determinations of aesthetic values and thereby to account for the objectivity of these values. This plane of axiological investigations was the sphere of intentional consciousness.

Attention must be drawn to the peculiar phenomenological understanding of objectivity. In phenomenology, the problem of the controversy between objectivism and subjectivism (relativism) has quite a different sense than in the whole of philosophy so far. It is therefore incorrect in this kind of philosophy to formulate this problem as a disjunction of "whether value is a property of things or human reaction to things."<sup>5</sup> This results from a phenomenological thesis about the intentional character of consciousness that is about its extension towards the object. Independence from the subject's consciousness, often a requirement of the objectivity of the object, is, in accordance with the assumption of the intentional character of consciousness, simply impossible. For a phenomenologist, objectivity is constituted in the subject's actual and potential experiences as an identical *ego*.<sup>6</sup> The borderline between *cogitatio* and *cogitatum* is in a way blurred. Changes also need to be made in the criteria of objectivity with regard to the aesthetic object as an intentional object and to aesthetic values. In his analysis of the essence of aesthetic value, Ingarden contends that no aesthetically valuable quality is directly a property of the work of art considered as a certain real object. It includes such characteristics, however, which, being aesthetically neutral in themselves, form the basis of aesthetically valuable qualities so that the latter are indirectly vested in the work of art.<sup>7</sup> The problem of the objectivity of aesthetic value is thus reduced to an analysis of the objective validity of aesthetic experience and to a qualitative analysis of the content

<sup>3</sup> A polemic with the principle of *De gustibus...* was often voiced by R. Ingarden, see for example *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*, Warszawa 1976, q 32 and 33 and his congress papers' *Uwagi o estetycznym sędzię wartościującym. Zasady epistemologicznego rozważania doświadczenia estetycznego*, „Studia z estetyki”, vol. 3, 1970, p. 155–174.

<sup>4</sup> Ingarden: *Wykłady i dyskusje z estetyki*, Warszawa 1981, p. 32–33.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Władysław Tatarkiewicz on various approaches to the issue of value, *Pojęcie wartości czyli co historyk filozofii ma do zakomunikowania historykowi sztuki[in:]*, *Parerga*, Warszawa 1978, p. 60–73.

<sup>6</sup> E. Husserl: *Medytacje kartezjańskie*, Warszawa 1982, p. 145.

<sup>7</sup> Ingarden: *Wykłady i dyskusje z estetyki*, p. 561.

of this experience that is to indicating the qualitative and at the same time *a priori* determinations of the semantic concept which is aesthetic value.

According to phenomenology, objectivity is vested in the objects of acts of consciousness which contain meanings, contents that refer to the material correlates of these acts of consciousness rather than to acts themselves.

The method of objective analyses also helps to re-interpret the problems of the objectivity of evaluations. Ingarden, whose merits in the investigation of values are unquestionable, suggests that the criterion of the objectivity of estimate should not be a causal relation between an aesthetic evaluation and the object under evaluation but rather the result of an analysis of the essential connections between the sense of valuing and that which is being valued.<sup>8</sup> It appears therefore that the issue of objectivity has a new formulation in phenomenological axiology, with original solutions postulated.

The purpose of this paper is to present Mikel Dufrenne's theory of aesthetic values, with a special emphasis on the antisubjectivistic and anti-relativistic tendencies of this theory. Dufrenne draws from the solutions of phenomenological axiology and espouses the conception of emotional intentional acts as experiences that apprehend values. He also tries to support his anti-relativistic conception of value by referring to the metaphysics of Nature.

In our discussion we shall proceed from the objective analysis of the validity of aesthetic experience as apprehending value towards the analysis of the ontological conditions of the possibility of this experience.

#### AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AS A SOURCE OF VALUE

In phenomenological aesthetics, aesthetic objects are considered as intentional correlates of definite experiences. For Dufrenne, aesthetic value is a noetic correlate of aesthetic experience. The nature and mode of existence of value is determined by the course and structure of acts that grasp this value. According to Dufrenne, aesthetic experience has a perceptive character. It denotes a characteristic succession of acts that have a sensuous, representational, intellectual or emotional nature and that belong to the sphere of intentional consciousness. In these acts aesthetic value is apprehended which is identical with affective quality.

Dufrenne distinguishes three stages of aesthetic experience paralleled by three aspects of the aesthetic object: the stage of presence is paralleled by the sensuous in the aesthetic object, the stage of representation — by the represented world of the aesthetic object, and the stage of feeling is paralleled by the value of the aesthetic object.

Crucial in defining the nature of aesthetic value is the answer to the question about the character of feeling. An important element in accounting for the objective character of aesthetic value in Dufrenne's theory is the freeing of the concept of feeling from psychology. This has been carried out by distinguishing between feeling as experience which presents value and emotion. Dufrenne asserts that feeling (*sentiment*) is different from emotion (*emotion*), which is a psychological reaction to conceptual formations already

<sup>8</sup> Ingarden: *Uwagi o estetycznym sądzie wartościującym*, p. 159.

formulated (value, the aesthetic object). Feeling is knowledge (*connaissance*) and has a cognitive – revelatory function, which is the discovery of the meaning of the world. Contrary to feeling, which reveals (*revelé*), emotion comments (*commenté*) upon the world already given.<sup>9</sup> However, Dufrenne makes a reservation that, although feeling is a cognitive faculty which appeals to sensitivity, yet it discovers the objective rather than subjective world of the subject's experience. Feeling (*sentiment*) is thus a cognitive act meant to know aesthetic value. Dufrenne's conception of feeling contains all the essential characteristics of the phenomenological conception of emotions: a) an assumption about the intentional character of consciousness, b) recognition of feeling as an act of this consciousness, c) a distinction between feeling in a cognitive sense and emotion understood as a psychological reaction, d) assigning a cognitive function to feeling.<sup>10</sup>

Through his conception of *sentiment* as a fully reliable source of knowing values Dufrenne seems to join those phenomenologists who are trying to overthrow the traditional view upon the subjectivism or relativism of the objects of emotional acts.

#### A PRIORI CHARACTER OF AESTHETIC VALUES

Dufrenne identifies aesthetic value with the affective *a priori* through which the world is revealed.<sup>11</sup> What is affective *a priori* and can its theory be regraded as a justified premise of the objective character of aesthetic value? To answer this question, we must start from the notion of *a priori*. In phenomenological axiology (especially owing to Scheler and his conception of material ethics), this notion became the crucial point of reorientation in the hitherto knowledge about necessary nexuses.<sup>12</sup>

The phenomenological conception of *a priori* is a polemic with Kant's subjectivism, intellectualism and formalism with regard to this notion. For Kant, knowledge *a priori* as *par excellence* scientific, universal and necessary, is opposed to knowledge through empirical experience. Since the *a priori* of all experience are for Kant the forms (time and space) and the categories of intellect, *a priori* knowledge can relate only to the subject's own cognitive structures as permanent and formal constituents of experience. The consequence of this formalism is the exclusion of knowledge from *a priori* sciences as it relates only to the qualitative or material *apparatus* of the object. Kant contended that

<sup>9</sup> M. Dufrenne: *Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique*, Paris 1953, p. 471.

<sup>10</sup> On feelings as a specific source of cognition see H. Buczyńska-Garewicz: *Uczucie i rozum w świecie wartości*, Wrocław 1975; W. Cichoń: *Świat wartości i sposoby jego poznawania*, [in:] *Studia z teorii poznania i filozofii wartości*, Wrocław 1978, p. 163–176; B. Dzie midok, *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych w polskiej estetyce dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, see chapter *O swoistości przeżyć emocjonalnych doświadczanych podczas obcowania z dziełem sztuki*, p. 144–186. A. B. Stępień: *Z problematyki doświadczenia estetycznego*, "Zeszyty Naukowe KUL", XXIII, 186, 1980, p. 33–38.

<sup>11</sup> M. Dufrenne: *Les valeurs esthétiques*, "Esthétique et philosophie", vol. 2, p. 33. Also by Dufrenne: *Phénoménologie...*, p. 660; *Pour l'homme*, Paris 1968, p. 171–174.

<sup>12</sup> M. Scheler: *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Halle 1927, III.

the "matter" of experience or sensations were devoid of necessary nexuses and could not thereby be the domain of *a priori* sciences.<sup>13</sup>

A *sui generis* revolution in understanding the *a priori* was made only by Max Scheler. Having modified the notion of *a priori*, he constructed his well-known ethics of content. Contrary to Kant, Scheler asserted that the *a priori* knowledge (with regard to necessary nexuses in the structure of the object studied) pertains to material or qualitative apparatus of things and relations between qualities.

Dufrenne's conception of the affective *a priori* has many convergent points with Scheler's theory: a) it is a conception of material *a priori* because the *a priori* refers to a quality given in inspection, b) it is anti-subjectivistic because the *a priori* embraces both the objective and subjective aspects, c) it is anti-intellectual because the *a priori* refers to affectivity or feeling. By adopting such a conception of *a priori* Dufrenne wants to accentuate the qualitative and actual permeation of value in the object. At the same time he asserts that the successive moments of aesthetic experience are paralleled by definite types of *a priori*. They are: the corporeal *a priori* apprehending the sensuous aspect of the aesthetic object, the representational *a priori* which constitutes the represented world and the affective *a priori* which enables the expression of the aesthetic object to be apprehended. The last-named *a priori* play the crucial part in aesthetic experience. Dufrenne names two aspects of the affective *a priori*: subjective (the existential *a priori*) and objective (the cosmological *a priori*). The former define a set of man's fundamental attitudes towards the world, they are the models of human expression to the world. The latter, on the other hand, are the determinations of nature and mark extra-individual necessities in the relation between man and the world. The two kinds of the affective *a priori* function as two complementary aspects of the *a priori* affective quality. For Dufrenne believes that any knowledge is always man's knowledge of the world: the condition of this knowledge presupposes a peculiar unity of the existential and cosmological *a priori*.

*A priori* relates to the affective quality. The notion of the *a priori* affective quality is connected with the expressed world of the aesthetic object. It is a certain whole super-structured upon the arrangement of represented elements in the work. The expressed world renders the unique in the aesthetic object: a certain atmosphere whose sense cannot be reduced to the meanings of the presented objects. It is the affective quality identified with value that determines the character of this atmosphere. The affective quality incorporates the affective meaning of the aesthetic object; it is the principle of the unity of the expressed world; it has constitutive and formative functions; it expresses and illustrates the idea (truth, sense) which resides in the work of art. The affective *a priori* quality considered in the cosmological aspect denotes a certain meaning prior to experience and imparted by sign.

Thus, the joyful in Mozart or the comic in Molière, which are singular, are the *a priori* forms of the affective attitude towards the world. They exist potentially and demand that Mozart or Molière discover them for humanity. As universal forms of contact between man and the world, the affective *a priori* designate a kind of primordial harmony between the subject and the object, the man and the world.

<sup>13</sup> I. Kant: *Krytyka czystego rozumu*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1957, p. 59–69. See also Dufrenne: *Heidegger et Kant, Jalons*, La Haye 1966, p. 84–111.

The means of differentiating and grasping the affective *a priori* quality are affective categories termed also aesthetic categories. The precondition of experiencing the value of the beautiful, the graceful or the sublime is man's prior disposition to recognize them. This disposition is for Dufrenne primordial knowledge of affective categories, an *a priori* taste, sensitivity which is at the same time a way of responding to the human world, thereby enabling us to answer the appearance of humanity in the object or as Dufrenne put it "to recognize the human countenance of the world".<sup>14</sup>

This conception of the affective categories may recall the theory of categories as *a priori* forms of cognition of Kant's *Verstand*. The subject, who is the exponent of the affective categories, is, however, entirely different from Kant's transcendental subject that represents the entirely depersonalized non-individual ego. Kant's *a priori* forms of cognition warrant its universality and necessity. Dufrenne's theory emphasizes the singular and concrete character of the subject as a carrier of the affective categories. These categories are part of personality (deep self — *moi profond*) and have individual singularity. At the same time, however, they are necessary because necessity is vested in each of the subject's individual attitude to the world. The joyful in Mozart and the pathetic in Beethoven are attributes of being. Until they are discovered or until there is a Mozart or a Beethoven capable, through his existential *a priori*, of forming a kind of cognitive sympathy with definite cosmological *a priori*, we can only speak of the potential existence of the affective *a priori* quality.

Dufrenne assumes that there is a universe of the affective *a priori*. Yet it exists only potentially, as virtuality. We cannot make a complete description of all its constituent qualities or aesthetic values because we shall never have all the aesthetic objects that are their actualizations. We cannot likewise make an inventory of aesthetic values of Mendeleev's axiological table because the affective categories are non-discursive. For those reasons it is impossible, Dufrenne contends, to construct a pure aesthetics similar to Kant's pure natural history.

The conferral of the *a priori* status upon aesthetic values is a manifestation of an objectivistic tendency. The same tendency underlies the assumption of the universe of values. On the other hand, Dufrenne accepts the fundamental thesis of existential phenomenology that we cannot think of the subject and the world as isolated from one another: the world is always the world-for-the-man. The latter tendency seems to protect Dufrenne from falling into Plato-like objective idealism,<sup>15</sup> while extreme axiological absolutism is fended off by his theory in the recognition of the potential character of the universe of values.

#### AESTHETIC VALUATION AND ITS SENSE

Although Dufrenne uses the term "judgment of taste" (*jugement de goût*), yet in his aesthetic conception there is no room for the notion of judgment in the logical sense.

<sup>14</sup> Dufrenne: *Phénoménologie...*, p. 546–557, and see his *La notion d'a priori*, Paris 1959, p. 53–66.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Makota: *O klasyfikacji sztuk pięknych*, p. 130.

Judgment of taste is an immediate experience, concept-free and, as Dufrenne holds, happy. During this experience the affective quality is subsumed under the respective affective category. This event takes place entirely on the prereflexive plane: the power of aesthetic judgment is feeling. Aesthetic valuation, which knows no other form than affirmation, is accompanied by the cry of *eureka!* The antithesis of valuation is simply imperviousness to values.

Dufrenne occupies the position of the universal judgment of taste. He consists in situating the principle of universality in the subject and asserts that the subjective conditions of judgment are the same in all people, leads to relativism and subjectivism.<sup>16</sup> According to Dufrenne, valuation is mediated in the *a priori* which, by connecting the cosmological and existential aspects, avoids Kant's *a priori* subjectivism. Valuation is the subject's immediate response to the aesthetic object. This response precedes all comparison and reference to external criteria and consists in the discovery of the internal necessity of the work of art.

An act of aesthetic valuation is free from an intellectual expression in the form of judgment. Dufrenne writes in *Le poétique/ Dire/ cela est beau, c'est dire aussi/ cela a un sens/ Mais ce sens n'est pas ordonné - une nécessité logique, il est ordonné - une nécessité esthétique.*<sup>17</sup>

Dufrenne attributes to values an ability of revealing truth in the form of affective quality. Values as specific modes of intentionality express fundamental relations of a concrete human subject with the world. Values are identified with the subjective sense of the world, that is why they have an individual character — the pathetic in Beethoven, the serene in Bach. This individualized character of value does not mean its subjectivity. The unity of the individual and at the same time universal is for Dufrenne the quintessence of real art.

Dufrenne avoids formulating a direct definition of value. Instead, his writings contain numerous metaphorical expressions which are certain intellectual epitomes. These include a formulation that value is the focus of the true.<sup>18</sup> To discover values is to discover the truth of Nature: the revelation of Nature is at once its affirmation. Just as for Hegel history is a process of the self-realizing reason, so too for Dufrenne, art and the world of its values are a dynamic process of the objectivization of the idea of humanity. Aesthetic experiences and values actualized in their course demonstrate a peculiar phenomenology of the spirit: they reveal all the time new forms of man's affective attitude to the world. These forms are determined by the affective *a priori*, which, by the agency of the artist and the recipient, assume the sensible (qualitative) shape and become values. Value is the truth alienated in the process of aesthetic experience, which is the self-consciousness of humanity as a collective subject. Particular "aesthetic worlds" of the works of art form the objectification of this truth. For Dufrenne, just as the universe is reflected in every monad, so the world is reflected in particular aesthetic worlds.<sup>19</sup> With

<sup>16</sup> M. Dufrenne: *Le Beau*, "Esthétique et philosophie", vol. 1, p. 21.

<sup>17</sup> Dufrenne: *Le poétique*, Paris 1963, p. 175.

<sup>18</sup> Dufrenne: *Les valeurs esthétiques*, p. 34, 36.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

this metaphor he reactivates, in his theory of aesthetic values, the idea of the subject as a microcosm which reflects the macrocosm of the world.

#### CREATION OF VALUES AS EXPRESSION OF NATURE

The concept of creating values does not mean for Dufrenne the divine creation *ex nihilo*. Rather, in conformity with the meaning of *créer*, it denotes reproduction. This is to emphasize that the creator's aesthetic experience is reproductive rather than constitutive. Value is not produced by the subject. Its creation-reproduction does not mean, as Dufrenne stresses, the subjectification of that which is being discovered. This notion of creation can be aptly rendered by K. M. Sarbiewski's term *de novo creat*.

Aesthetic value is mediated in Nature. Nature as the foundation of all *a priori* "appoints" the artist to discover its meaning or value. Nature for Dufrenne is *Natura naturans* – creative and dynamic, which denotes reality in its becoming, in the actualization of potentiality.

The dynamic aspect of creative Nature is primarily the emergence of consciousness. The centre of this process is man – a part of Nature privileged for the ability to focus and express meaning. It is in man that Nature achieves its self-consciousness. *L'homme est un moment de l'être, le moment où le sens se recueille.*<sup>20</sup>

Between man and Nature there is an ontological affinity, which, on the epistemological plane, corresponds to the intentional extension of consciousness towards the object. A singular part in the revelation of the meaning of being is played by art and aesthetic experience. Only the aesthetic experience permits us to grasp, through feeling, the proper that is affective meaning of being. For Dufrenne it is intentionality and the affinity of man and Nature that make it possible for meaning to emerge (always as a human meaning). "Every work of art is subjective to become objective"<sup>21</sup> – this apparent paradox is fully explained by Dufrenne's theory of creation.

Although the whole of Dufrenne's philosophy is imbued with glorification of the greatness of man as the cognitive subject, the inspiring and active role in the cognitive process belongs to Nature. The artist is merely a medium. This medium leaves his impress on the object, yet he does not create a work exclusively for his satisfaction and according to his free imagination. The artist is a man who, through his special sensitivity residing in the existential *a priori*, is able to discover and express a unique aspect of reality. Nature seeks the only one creator who can express it by a perfect union of the singularity and generality of the existential and cosmological *a priori*.

The proper definition of reality as a structure of Nature's meaning, given by the artist to an aesthetic object, is the notion of the world. This concept denotes a reality subject to the percipient consciousness and focussed in the experience of a certain individual being. However, Dufrenne warns us against a ready acceptance of the aesthetic object as a subjective construction. Although the world of the aesthetic object is named after its

<sup>20</sup> Dufrenne: *Phénoménologie...*, p. 661.

<sup>21</sup> Dufrenne: *Les valeurs esthétiques*, p. 34.

discoverer, like the worlds of Michelangelo, Bach, or Moliere, yet it is primarily a reflection of Nature, a qualitative form of unique and prereflexive meaning.

Dufrenne writes that the artist is the happy voyager who, having sailed the seas of doubt and toil for a long time, can finally exclaim: Land! The work is done! How do we know it? Because something has been expressed that cannot be expressed in another way.<sup>22</sup> The conception of creation as a realization of a certain calling is accompanied by the figure of the inspired poet, whose principal characteristics, beside the depth of personality, is authenticity. *Le poète authentique est toujours le voyant qui délivre la parole de la Nature.*<sup>23</sup> The artist's authenticity harmonizes with the authenticity of Nature striving to realize its meaning in art. Nature incites the artist to reveal its meaning as a meaning-for-man. The category which serves to define Nature as the source of the affective meanings is the poetic (*le poétique*). The poetic denotes the expressiveness of images through which Nature's *poein* is expressed. The poetic is present in the sublime, the grotesque or the graceful because they are varieties of expressiveness. As a universal category, the poetic denotes Nature's disposition to reveal itself, this disposition residing both in Nature and in man. The poetic is also a universal category in that, as a condition of expression of the *a priori* being. It is thus expressiveness understood as an attribute of Nature, the fundamental distinguishing mark of its dynamics.

With the character of the object of expression Dufrenne observes that, although the verb *exprimer* (express) often assumes a reflexive form *s'exprimer*, we should not follow the linguistic suggestion that in expression we are dealing with the subjectivity of the subject. Dufrenne contends that the verb *s'exprimer* denotes that something is expressed through the subject. The sense of expression is thus not subjective. This is a primordial way of presenting a meaning, where the signifying and signified elements are not connected arbitrarily, following external associations, but where meaning is immanent in the sign. Dufrenne calls it natural meaning: the word does not refer us to its designate but evokes in us the emotional counterpart of this designate.

The case is similar with the represented objects in the works of art. The chair in a painting by Van Gogh is not merely a piece of furniture but through colours and shapes it expresses passions, the world of Van Gogh. This world at the same time embodies the meaning of Nature. This world is the object of expression while the emotion accompanying its apprehension is not. On the other hand, feeling, different from emotion, has a cognitive function. It is not a subjective dimension but intentionality – an extension towards the object. Feeling discovers an aspect of reality: *Tout homme, s'il aime, sur le visage de la femme aimée découvre un monde, comme Lamartine sur Elvire découvre le lac ou le vallon, Aragon sur Elsa la fraternité et la douceur.*<sup>24</sup>

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the category of creative Nature (*Natura naturans*) is the central concept of Dufrenne's ontology and plays also a major role in his theory of aesthetic values. Underlying this close connection of views upon being and aesthetic value are two assumptions, although not explicitly formulated yet obvious in

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Dufrenne: *Le poétique*, p. 179.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113–114.

the light of the present discussion. One is the adoption of a thesis about the panaesthetic character of reality (the poetic of Nature is an *a priori* of all *a priori*, meaning is always an affective meaning and aesthetic experience is a universal model of all cognition). The other assumption, following exactly from the former, is the identification of the meaning of being (as the poetic being or potentially containing the status of aesthetic object) with aesthetic value.

The consequence of these assumptions is the affirmative and reproductive attitude of art to Nature. On account of its kinship with man, Nature is humanistic: "good" and "beautiful". In art and through art there takes place glorification of all that conforms with Nature. Aesthetic value is the affirmation of the humanistic meaning of Nature.

The metaphorical concept of *Natura naturans* poses some difficulties for the interpreter of Dufrenne's philosophy. The definition of Nature is some *logos*, a source of meaning or a cosmological process of the emergence of the world of values is not unequivocal. However, neither an interpretation after Spinoza nor after Hegel seems entirely accurate. The problem certainly needs to be investigated more thoroughly than within the present paper.

From the standpoint of axiological consideration it is yet important that Nature is consistently understood by Dufrenne as the primordial source of meaning, prior to man. This point can be treated as a significant premise of anti-relativism. There are, however, problems which raise doubt while it is possible that their solution would throw new light on the theory of aesthetic values. For example: how is it possible and what does this primordial (pre-ontological as Dufrenne puts it) character of the contact between man and Nature consist in? If, as Dufrenne says, Nature has an inspiring role in the process of the emergence of meaning and if, which is entirely justified, we reject a theist interpretation of Nature, a question arises: in what sense is man part of Nature and what makes him feel at home in Nature? The answers to these questions can first of all enrich our understanding of the rather enigmatic concepts of the existential and cosmological *a priori*, which are crucial for the theory of aesthetic values.

#### AN EVALUATION. NEW PERSPECTIVES OF THE THEORY OF AESTHETIC VALUES

A characteristic motive of the present aesthetic conception, clearly evident in the theory of aesthetic values, is the programmatic assumption of some indefiniteness of the object of investigation. This motive is hardly novel in philosophy, especially in axiology. We could recall Aristotle's assertion that it is sufficient if the work of our object achieves the degree of clarity permitted by this object because not all investigations require the same degree of accuracy. We also know Petrarch's *non so ch * referring to beauty or Leibniz's: "*et au reste il faut dire que c'est un je ne sais quoi*" about the object of aesthetic judgment.

Already in Dufrenne's theory of aesthetic experience we deal with some peculiar irrationalization manifested in the adoption of a thesis, with significant consequences that aesthetic experience is prereflexive knowledge. Affective quality apprehended in this experience cannot be discursively articulated but only felt. We must add that Dufrenne

extends the model of illogical cognition beyond aesthetics, asserting that aesthetic experience should fulfil a propaedeutical function towards all cognition in general.

In his theory of the aesthetic object Dufrenne contends that this object in its structure is similar to human subjectivity – it is a quasi-subject. Allowing for the fact that human consciousness is inexhaustible, Dufrenne characterizes it with the concepts of depth and authenticity, making a recourse to the intuitive meanings of these terms. Similar ambiguities reside in the concepts of proximity, consubstantiality and kinship (*proximité*, *consubstantialité*, *familiarité*) which serve to determine the connection between the subject and the object.<sup>25</sup> Dufrenne also avoids precise definitions of the existential and cosmological *a priori*, saying that the affective *a priori* cannot be conceptually defined.

This trait of Dufrenne's theory does not seem to follow from imperfect instruments of investigation or from agnosticism (despite his assertion that pure aesthetic is impossible). Rather, it is a conscious irrationalization of the objects of aesthetic experience (including values) by accentuating the immediate and affective character of this experience.

The crucial role of the programme of formulating an antirelativistic theory of emotions in axiology (especially in aesthetics) has already been indicated. Dufrenne's aesthetic system certainly contains many suggestions in this respect, the most interesting being the conception of the affective *a priori*.

The term *sentiment*, which Dufrenne employs, denoted in French aesthetics feeling, taste, the sixth sense and was decidedly connected with the relativistic tradition.<sup>26</sup> Dufrenne breaks with this tradition and draws on phenomenological conceptions of emotions as intentional acts directed towards various objects, including values. A new way, initiated by Brentano, of analyzing emotional valuing experiences, which is based on the fundamental distinction between a psychical state as a reaction to something and an intentional emotional act immediately apprehending meaning, was employed by phenomenologists, particularly by Scheler. The sphere where objective meanings appear is the pure intentional consciousness subjected to a prior phenomenological reduction. Besides other intentional acts, this stream contains emotive acts.

If we reject a conviction that the division into intentional emotional acts and psychical states is given to the subject in the source-revealing ocularity, this division will prove entirely arbitrary. In Dufrenne's system this division is paralleled by the division into emotion (*émotion*) and feeling (*sentiment*), yet this essential moment of discussion seems to be oversimplified. No deeper structural analysis of the two experiences justifies the need of their distinction. This kind of analysis is given more necessary in Dufrenne's theory, who rejects phenomenological reduction and assumes the integrality of psyche and consciousness.

It is difficult to decide about the value of the phenomenological search for the methods of depsychologizing theory of emotions. We can agree that feelings present

<sup>25</sup> Cf. M. Dufrenne: *Intentionalite et esthétique*, "Esthétique et philosophie", vol. I, p. 58–61.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. S. Pazura: *Rozważania nad pojęciem smaku estetycznego*, Warszawa 1981, p. 106–117.

certain meanings but many more arduous analyses are needed (the eidetic method should not be excluded – quite the reverse) in order to answer the question whether always and in what way feeling is a carrier of the objective content and not merely a subjective experience.

We can recall that Ingarden also distinguishes emotions in the aesthetic sense (identifiable with intentional emotional acts in the phenomenological sense): preliminary emotion with emotional response to value and vital emotions that are entirely unnecessary or even undesirable in aesthetic experience. To a greater extent Ingarden takes into account the subjective and objective conditions of the two types of emotion without, however, sufficiently analyzing, like Dufrenne, their internal structure. Hence follows the depreciation, unconvincing and controversial for some, of non-aesthetic feelings in Ingarden's theory of aesthetic experience.<sup>27</sup>

An answer to the question whether Dufrenne succeeds in his attempt of overcoming axiological relativism depends on the definite interpreting assumptions. For we could question the fundamental assumption of phenomenology about the validity of immediate knowledge, and consequently reject the deontological character of aesthetic experience and aesthetic objectivism. We could also recognize metaphysics of Nature as a kind of panpsychism and reject Dufrenne's thesis about Nature as the objective source of all *a priori*, independent of consciousness.

It is worth making an immanent criticism of Dufrenne's theory of values, taking into account the phenomenological assumptions of the theory under consideration. For this purpose we shall find it very helpful to use the conceptual apparatus developed by Ingarden in his article *Zagadnienie systemu jakości estetycznie doniosłych* (The Problem of a System of Aesthetically Significant Values). Ingarden distinguished in it six pairs of senses of the terms "subjective – objective". The fifth sense of the term "objective" runs as follows: "sufficiently conditioned by the subject and at least by some of its properties".<sup>28</sup>

If we adopt such a criterion of objectivity, we can admit that Dufrenne's theory of aesthetic values is objectivistic. Value or affective quality appears in the aesthetic object, or more precisely, in its sensible side. This sensuous aspect of the aesthetic object is a harmony, characteristic of this object, of qualitative elements, superstructured upon which is the integrating whole and the affective *a priori* quality that gives it a peculiar atmosphere. The French term *sensible*, the sensuous aspect of the aesthetic object, is connected with the category of the represented world. Its elements attempt to imitate the real world. Dufrenne defines the represented world as "the sphere of implicit meanings". The represented world is the foundation upon which the expressed world appears. This concept is one more synonym of aesthetic value.

Although the aesthetic object is intentional and thus heteronomous with respect to being, yet value in Dufrenne's conception is objective also in the third of Ingarden's senses: as "existing independently of conscious experiences in general, and in particular of a) cognitive acts, b) conscious productive acts."<sup>29</sup> This character of the objectivity of

<sup>27</sup> D z i e m i d o k : *Teoria przeżyć i wartości estetycznych...*,

<sup>28</sup> I n g a r d e n : *Studia z estetyki*, vol. 3, p. 306–308.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

value follows from an *a priori* understanding of value as an aspect of being. Before we qualify this view as classical axiological absolutism, an essential doubt appears however, for, although value exists independently of the subject, its existence is virtual. Value can be defined with a German term *seinsollen*. But virtuality of the existence of value does not imply relativism or axiological relationism because actualization of this potentiality is effected through the dynamics of being (*Natura naturans*). For Nature seeks those who can express its meaning identified with value. This is thus a theory with a strong objectivistic tendency, which tries to avoid extreme solutions.

This avoidance is not always convincing. The theory of the affective *a priori* as a universe of values is certainly a manifestation of anti-relativistic tendencies which assume absolutist and universalist character. Dufrenne's state of values has no borders, no hierarchy or principles of preference; the comic of Molière, the tragic of Sophocles or the serene of Mozart exist side by side. Each of these qualities is at the same time an aspect of being, it is unique and at the same time illustrates the universal idea of humanity.

In the present paper we make frequent references to the views of the Polish phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden. The problem of similarities and differences in the aesthetics of Dufrenne and of Ingarden has to some extent been dealt with by Maria Gołaszewska.<sup>30</sup> This interesting issue has not yet been exhausted, nor is the purpose of this paper to do so. References to Ingarden's views about and solutions of the problem of aesthetic values seemed necessary because the already classic value of Ingarden's discoveries permits more fully and thoroughly to interpret other theories of this orientation.

Ingarden's phenomenology stems directly from Husserlian tradition. The name of "the great analyst", which Ingarden uses for his teacher, could likewise be applied to Ingarden himself. Conscientiousness of analyses and care about intersubjective communicability of the text distinguishes Ingarden's philosophy from among other phenomenologies, especially those with existentialist orientation. This philosophical style of Ingarden's may have also influenced the Polish trend of analytical philosophy connected with the Lvov-Warsaw school and developing parallel with Ingarden's achievements. Although Twardowski and his disciples rejected the principles of phenomenology and Ingarden himself was often engaged in polemic with the minimalism of the school, we could find in Ingarden's philosophical and logical culture the evidence of influence of the Polish analytical tradition.

We have already indicated some similarities in Dufrenne's and Ingarden's theories of aesthetic values. They primarily consist in decided anti-relativism (in different forms, however), in the adoption of the qualitative nature of aesthetic value (yet not reducible to the sensuous characteristics of the object) and in granting to a definite emotional experience the ability to apprehend values. A more detailed analysis could demonstrate that these similarities are practically negligible. Although Dufrenne and Ingarden come from the common phenomenological tradition, both the methods and results of their investigations are different. The two thinkers were aware of those differences. A book in memory of Ingarden contains a paper by Dufrenne with his note about the relationship of the two philosophers. Dufrenne writes that his views suggest a phenomenological orienta-

<sup>30</sup> Gołaszewska: *Świat sztuki..*

tion in the direction which was not accepted by this heir (i.e. Ingarden) to Husserl's thought.<sup>31</sup>

Ingarden represents the analytical-rationalist trend in phenomenology. He abandons general synthesis for the sake of objective studies. In his theory of aesthetic values, which he treats as preparatory, he adopts the method of substantial analysis and decides about the fundamental issues from intuitive data. Ingarden analyzes value with respect to its form, matter and the mode of existence. But his solutions are not final or unequivocal. Value possesses none of the basic modes of existence — real, ideal or intentional. Although value is connected with the object, yet not as its characteristic but as a polyphonic — synthetic qualification superstructured upon these characteristics. The controversy about the objectivity of values can be resolved in a positive way if we demonstrate that the qualities of aesthetic values are sufficiently established in the choice of aesthetically valuable qualities and in aesthetically neutral but artistically valent qualities.<sup>32</sup>

Dufrenne's ambition is to make a synthesis. In his theory of aesthetic values he abandons the precision of objective studies. Underlying his theory is the assumption that aesthetic value appears in man's existential experience. Dufrenne is less interested in the nature of values and more in the primarily anthropological and then ontological and epistemological conditions of the occurrence of the encounter itself with value. Dufrenne consciously strives to transform his phenomenology of aesthetic experience apprehending value into a theory of being. This methodological attitude together with a philosophy of Nature, full of anthropomorphist metaphysics, sometimes leads to the obliteration of difference between being and value.

Dufrenne's aesthetics was influenced both by the Husserlian tradition of his native phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) and predominantly by existentialisms of Heidegger's and Sartre's. It is to the latter influence that Dufrenne owes the *modus loquendi* of his philosophy and an ambition to solve the problems of aesthetics through existential issues. Dufrenne's aesthetics also reflects the classic philosophical tradition (Plato, Kant, Hegel). In spite of many difficulties which this aesthetics encounters it is consistent in attempting to construct a synthetics of the world and of man and art within a uniform system. The theory of value is entangled in the problems of philosophy of man and Nature, in the theory of cognition and the theory of being. At the same time, as Gołaszewska stresses, aesthetic value is analyzed in the whole of human life, which denotes an extremely strong and deeply rooted tie of human sensitivity with that which is presented in aesthetic experience. "Dufrenne's world of values is not a system of forms and qualities lying on the surface of events but a spring that gushes from the depths".<sup>33</sup>

In his later works (*Art and politique*, 1974; *Subversion, perversion*, 1976) Dufrenne abandons phenomenological-ontological analyses and epistemological problems of aesthetics for the studies on contemporary art through the methodologies of semiotics, Marxism, existential phenomenology or psychoanalysis.

<sup>31</sup> M. Dufrenne: *Filozofia człowieka i filozofia Natury. Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena*, Warszawa 1972, p. 483–492.

<sup>32</sup> Ingarden: *Wartość estetyczna i zagadnienie jej obiektywnego ugruntowania, Studia z estetyki*, p. 261–262.

<sup>33</sup> Gołaszewska: *Świat sztuki...*, p. 396.

On the plane of culture conceived by Dufrenne in the aspect of its institutional forms, the conception of value as affirmation of that which exists is untenable.

The contradiction between the humanistic character of Nature and the alienated system of culture and politics implies a new calling of art and also modifies the concept of aesthetic value. Art cannot be affirmation of a system, acceptance of reality; it should not embellish Nature or imitate itself but should leave museums and art academies.<sup>34</sup> Its new calling is to restore freedom, naturalness and power of imagination. The new art should be a spontaneous play, free and unrestricted creation. It should be affirmation of life in its freedom and power. Artistic practice should be accompanied by political practice: the new art must have a revolutionary character, it must reject the existing values and become anti-culture.

In view of such a calling of art, value ceases to be a quality through which Nature is manifested. Value is activity, a practice whose goal is to restore to man his naturalness which he lost under the influence of numerous forms of alienation. Such a conception of value permits us to take into account present-day artistic achievements which are considered in terms of events rather than works or art.<sup>35</sup>

#### STRESZCZENIE

Koncepcja M. Dufrenne'a opiera się na fenomenologicznych założeniach aksjologii i ujmuje wartość estetyczną jako korelat doświadczenia estetycznego. To zaś rozumiane jest jako zespół aktów świadomości intencjonalnej (są to akty natury zmysłowej, wyobraźniowej, intelektualnej afektywnej) skierowanej na uchwycenie przedmiotu estetycznego i wartości estetycznej. Główną rolę w uchwyceniu wartości odgrywa czynnik afektywny – uczucie (*sentiment*). Przeciwstawiając się tendencjom psychologizycznym, Dufrenne traktuje uczucie jako *tertium datur* – równie prawomocne jak zmysłowe i rozumowe źródło poznania. Nawiązując do M. Schelera ujmuje uczucie jako intencjonalny akt emocjonalny skierowany na wartość. Jednocześnie przeciwstawia je konsekwentnie emocji (*emotion*), która jest jedynie reakcją psychofizyczną, pozbawioną w odróżnieniu od uczucia, mocy kognitywnej.

Według Dufrenne'a wartość ma charakter aprioryczny a zarazem jakościowy. Jej istotę stanowi jakość afektywna *a priori*, będąca jednością elementu podmiotowego (*a priori* egzystencjalne) i przedmiotowego (*a priori* kosmologiczne). Jakość afektywna *a priori* to pewien aspekt bytu, sens, który może być uchwycony jedynie poprzez medium ludzkie. Jakości afektywne *a priori* wyrażają sens bytu poprzedzający wszelkie doświadczenie a zarazem określają niewyczerpalny zbiór fundamentalnych postaw człowieka wobec świata. Jakościom afektywnym odpowiadają kategorie afektywne *a priori* (na przykład patos Beethovena, komizm Moliera, tragizm Sofoklesa). Są one warunkiem możliwości doświadczenia estetycznego i stanowią rodzaj apriorycznej wrażliwości podmiotu, która zapewnia odbiorcy bezpośrednie doznanie wartości dzieła sztuki. Uchwycenie wartości oznacza odkrycie sense bytu, zawartego w zmysłowym kształcie dzieła. Sens ów istnieje wirtualnie, dopóki nie zostanie przez geniuszy Beethovena, Moliera czy Sofoklesa przyobleczony w jakościową formę przedmiotu estetycznego. Wartość jest dla Dufrenne'a ogniskiem prawdy, sensem bytu każdorazowo afirmowanym w doświadczeniu estetycznym przez odbiorcę. W koncepcji tej nastąpiło zatem zbliżenie porządku wartości i porządku poznania, co prowadzi w efekcie do zapoznania analizy swoistości estetycznej badanych wartości.

<sup>34</sup> M. Dufrenne: *Art et politique*, Bucarest 1977.

<sup>35</sup> M. Dufrenne: *La pratique artistique comme pratique utopique. Crisis of Aesthetics?*, Kraków 1979, p. 72.

## РЕЗЮМЕ

Концепция М. Дифрена (M. Dufrenne) основана на феноменологических принципах аксиологии и объясняет эстетическую ценность как коррелят эстетического опыта. Это принимается как состав актов намеренной сознательности (эти акты бывают чувственным, выобразительного, интеллектуального и аффективного характера) направленной на уловление эстетического предмета и эстетического значения. Главную роль в уловлении значения исполняет аффективный элемент — чувство (*sentiment*). Противопоставляясь психологическим тенденциям, Дифрен рассматривает чувство как *tertium datur* также правомочное как чувственное и интеллектуальное — источник познания. Навязывая к М. Шелеру (Scheler), Дифрен рассматривает чувство как намеренный эмоциональный акт направленный на значение. Оно противопоставлено эмоции (*émotion*), которая является психологической реакцией, лишенной когнитивной силы, если сравнить ее с чувством.

По Дифрену, значение имеет априорный характер и одновременно качественный. Его суть заключена в аффективном качестве *a priori*, являющейся единством субъективного элемента (*a priori* экзистенциальное) и предметного (*a priori* космологическое). Аффективное качество *a priori* это некоторый аспект бытия. Этот смысл может быть уловлен только человеческим медиумом. Аффективные качества *a priori* выражают смысл бытия предшествующий всякие опыты, а также определяют неисчерпаемый сбор фундаментальных отношений человека к миру. Аффективным качествам отвечают аффективные категории *a priori* (например пафос Бетховена, комизм Мольера, трагизм Софокла). Они являются условием возможности эстетического опыта и представляют собой вид априорной чувствительности предмета, которая дает потребителю непосредственное ощущение значения произведения искусства. Уловление значения обозначает открытие смысла бытия, содержащегося в чувственной форме произведения. Этот смысл существует виртуально до тех пор, пока не будет гением Бетховена, Мольера или Софокла облечен в качественную форму эстетического предмета. Значение для Дифрена является очагом правды, смысла бытия, одобримые в этическом опыте потребителем. В этой концепции выступило сближение порядка значения и порядка познания, что ведет в результате к познанию анализа эстетического своеобразия исследованных значений.