

last three decades (A. Danto², J. Margolis³, G. Dickie⁴, T. Binkley⁵ and others). We may recall that the reason why traditional aesthetics was regarded as unsuccessful in art theory was not only its essentialism but also an almost universal tendency to treat art as a primarily aesthetic phenomenon. Furthermore, art was described in terms of its perceptual properties reduced as a rule to aesthetic qualities.

Both the general concept of fine arts and the view that beauty is a constitutive feature and a distinguishing mark of art (production of beautiful objects is the main task of art) were formulated as late as in the eighteenth century (Charles Batteau). Confronted with the then dominant neo-classic art which drew from the classic ideals of beauty of the ancient art, this conception appeared to be sound. In the same century the English philosophers (Shaftesbury, Addison, Hutcheson, Hume, Burke and others) voiced and justified the view that the theory of beauty (including also the category of the sublime) should be primarily a theory of aesthetic experiences.

Since the eighteenth century most aestheticians have held and still do that it is broadly-understood beauty and the aesthetic pleasure (satisfaction) evoked by beauty that are the universal distinguishing marks of art. In other words, the main task of art is the production of beautiful (aesthetically valuable) objects that give rise to specific satisfaction (i.e. aesthetic experience).

This view was questioned in artistic practice by romantic art in the following century. In all epochs that followed there appeared artistic trends (naturalism, expressionism, cubism, surrealism, dadaism, Conceptual art etc.) which, in a different way and to a different extent, systematically undermined the validity of the aesthetic conception of art. However, aestheticians did not revise the essence of their theory, even though they introduced some alterations. The category of beauty was replaced by the concepts of *aesthetic values and qualities*, and a more general concept of *aesthetic experience* was introduced instead of *aesthetic pleasure* or *satisfaction*. Aesthetic experience was understood so broadly that it lost its primary meaning that is still functioning in colloquial speech. Yet this broadening of the way aesthetic phenomena were understood did not essentially undermine the conviction about the aesthetic character of art.

In their defence of the conviction about the aesthetic nature of art, the aestheticians defended not only the right of aesthetics to make general theories of art but also, they were convinced, the autonomy of art. For art was also attributed with cognitive, moral, religious and political values, and not-aesthetic criteria were accordingly applied to art.

² Cf. A. Danto: *The artworld*, "Journal of Philosophy", vol. 61, 1964, p. 571–584 and his: *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Cambridge Mass. 1981.

³ G. Dickie: *The myth of the aesthetic attitude*, "American Philosophical Quarterly", vol. 1, 1964, p. 56–66 and his: *Aesthetics. An Introduction*, Indianapolis 1971, and *Art and Aesthetics: An Institutional Analysis*, Ithaca 1974.

⁴ J. Margolis: *Art and Philosophy. Conceptual Issues in Aesthetics*, Atlantic Highlands 1980.

⁵ T. Binkley: *Deciding about Art* [in:] L. Aagaard-Mogensen (ed.): *Culture and Art*, Nyborg and Atlantic Highlands 1976, p. 90–109, and his: *Piece: contra aesthetics*, "Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism", vol. 35, 1977, p. 265–277.

This practice posed a threat of subordinating art to politics, ideology, morality or religion and transforming it exclusively into the means of realizing aims outside art itself. Nor did aesthetic values and criteria specifically belong to art for they also concerned the natural world, productive activity and relations between people. They could not, however, be regarded as most essential for other forms of human activity and were indubitably, to a great extent, typical of art. Even those theorists who believed that a work of art could have non-aesthetic values (e.g. cognitive or moral values contributing to its global value) and that non-aesthetic criteria of evaluation could therefore be applied to art, even they did in most cases stress that the main and specific value (function) of art was its aesthetic value. It was difficult and cumbersome to define precisely what this value consisted in, that is why they often confined themselves to asserting that it consisted in the capacity of the work of art to evoke aesthetic experiences. Thus, the capacity to evoke aesthetic experience was regarded as the only common feature of all works of art. For it turned out that no one succeeded in discovering other common features of so diverse works of art as a symphony, a dance, a lyrical poem, a realistic novel, a Gothic cathedral, an ornate vase, a still-life or a film drama.

The solution of this problem, however, was incomplete for two main reasons. Firstly, as I have already said, the capacity to evoke aesthetic experiences was typical not only of art but also of non-artistic products of man and of natural objects. Secondly, a definition of aesthetic experience was needed that could be applied to all arts. The everyday emotionalist-hedonistic or sensualist-hedonistic understanding of aesthetic experience held true only for some relatively simple musical pieces or works of applied art. More complicated and richer experiences evoked by literary, theatrical, or musical or film works could not be reduced either to satisfactions derived from perceiving beautiful looks or to pleasurable emotional experiences. In that case, there were only two essential ways of overcoming this difficulty: either to acknowledge that experiences evoked by art are richer and more complicated than aesthetic experiences in the narrower and strict sense, or to broaden the understanding of aesthetic experience so that it would cover experiences evoked by art. The former solution was rejected for it undermined the conviction about the aesthetic nature of art; the conviction that aesthetic values are the only, essential and specific values of art.

The adoption of the broad sense of aesthetic experience inevitably resulted in a rejection of aesthetic hedonism, which has since been systematically and eagerly opposed by most aestheticians. Criticism of this conception can be found in almost every handbook of aesthetics. It would be very difficult now to encounter an aesthetician espousing aesthetic hedonism. For aestheticians *know* that art has an aesthetic nature and therefore experiences it evokes are in a way *ex definitione* aesthetic, while a hedonistic interpretation of these experiences is oversimplified and one-sided. There is no doubt that aesthetic hedonism will not bear criticism as an art theory and as a theory of art-evoked experiences. The experiences evoked by Dostoevsky's novels, by Bergman's films or Penderecki's music cannot certainly be reduced to pleasant sensations or feelings. Is aesthetic hedonism, however, just as wrong as the conception of aesthetic phenomena? How can we account for its unusual vitality? Aesthetic hedonism is constantly revived not only in everyday life and in colloquial speech but also in the works of some philosophers who

practice aesthetics or axiology (G. Santayana,⁶ D. W. Prall,⁷ R. B. Perry,⁸ W. P. Tugarinov,⁹) and of psychologists (W. Witwicki¹⁰). If an author is not bound by the accepted aesthetic definitions and he tries to characterize the specificity of aesthetic values or aesthetic experiences in relation to non-aesthetic values and experiences, then in his consideration there are, as a rule, at least some elements of aesthetic hedonism. If art could be abstracted from, some aestheticians might possibly not reject this conception so outright. For when we speak about experiences evoked by beautiful landscapes or by the beauty of human body, or by other human beings and man-made products, we are inclined to accept that this is a perceptual experience with a pleasurable emotional colouring (although this pleasure is not always pure and simple) and the source of this pleasant experience are looks perceived by the senses or, in other words, the structural properties and sensuous qualities of the perceived object. If "aesthetic experiences are experiences *towards things* directly given, responses to sights and sounds" (as Władysław Tatarkiewicz¹¹ held), then the aesthetic experience in such a narrow sense is not an experience evoked by literature. As early as in 1933 Tatarkiewicz wrote a paper *Postawa estetyczna, literacka i poetycka* (*Aesthetic, Literary and Poetic Attitudes*), where he contended that the main reason why the hitherto aesthetic theories had failed was that they applied a too broad understanding of aesthetic phenomena. The concepts of experiences of aesthetic objects and values are understood so broadly that they lose any definiteness. For example, the concept of aesthetic experience comprises three entirely different classes of experiences, which Tatarkiewicz calls aesthetic experience in the narrow and strict sense and literary and aesthetic experience. We obtain an aesthetic experience in the narrow sense while contemplating a given object, the source of the pleasure felt being the appearance of the object. Experiences like that are evoked by natural objects, by some products of craftsmanship or industry and only by some works of art (pieces of sculpture, paintings, musical pieces or works of architecture). Other works of art (literature, theatre, some musical pieces and works of fine arts) evoke experiences that Tatarkiewicz proposes to call literary or poetic. Concluding his paper, Tatarkiewicz emphasizes that the same "parcelling out" should be done with the remainder of the "pseudo-class" of phenomena that are named aesthetic because also objects and values called aesthetic are not a homogeneous class of objects and values. In the theory of art we should therefore speak about literary and poetic values different from

⁶ G. Santayana: *Sense of Beauty*, New York 1986.

⁷ D. W. Prall: *A Study in the Theory of Value*, "University of California Publications in Philosophy" III, 2, Berkeley 1921 and his: *Aesthetic Judgment*, New York 1929.

⁸ R. B. Perry: *Realms of Value*, Cambridge Mass. 1954, p. 332.

⁹ W. P. Tugarinov: *O wartościach życia i kultury* (*On the Values of Life and Culture*), Warszawa 1964, p. 225–27.

¹⁰ W. Witwicki: *Psychologia* (*Psychology*), vol. 2, Lvov 1930, p. 130.

¹¹ W. Tatarkiewicz: *Parerga*, Warszawa 1978, p. 72.

aesthetic values in the narrow sense as proposed by Tatarkiewicz¹². His conception of aesthetic experiences and values in the narrow sense was close, I believe, to D. Prall's conception of aesthetic surface.

This conception of Prall's was repeatedly criticized as treating aesthetic phenomena too narrowly. Nevertheless, other 20th-century aestheticians also supported the view that when we perceive and evaluate things aesthetically, we focus our attention on their appearances (shapes or colours). This view was espoused by such aestheticians as J. C. Urmson¹³, Vincent Tomas¹⁴ and Frank Sibley¹⁵. This narrow understanding of aesthetic phenomena converges with a conception of aesthetic values and artistic evaluation of works of art, opted, with all differences taken into account, by Peter Kivy, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Tomas Kulka and Göran Hermeren. In his 1980 book *Art in Action* Wolterstorff distinguishes between aesthetic excellence of the work of art and artistic excellence. The former consists in effectively providing satisfaction derived from contemplating a work of art. The latter is far more complicated and understood in a broader sense. Artistic excellence can be encountered, among others, in cognitive values, in the skill of performance, in originality, sincerity and even in religious, moral or entertaining values of a work if it was to serve such purposes.¹⁶ In his interesting reflections on music and its expressiveness, Kivy distinguishes between the narrow understanding of aesthetic evaluation and the broad understanding of artistic evaluation. The former concerns "sensuous and structural" properties of the work of art, whereas artistic evaluation concerns significant properties other than aesthetic.¹⁷

Tomas Kulka is chiefly concerned with painting, but his findings have a more universal character. In both of his papers Kulka distinguishes between aesthetic and artistic or art-historical values of a painting. The first type of value pertains to the visual qualities of the picture. It is assessed on the basis of visual perception alone, and it is relatively stable. In assessing the aesthetic value of a work, historical context and information about the place and role of the picture in the history of painting are not necessarily relevant. Likewise irrelevant are such possible merits of the picture as its authenticity, originality or novelty. All these facts are crucial in ascertaining the art-historical value of the work. According to Kulka, the artistic value of a picture cannot be ascertained without answering the question where, when and by whom it was painted, and without comparing it

¹² T a t a r k i e w i c z : *Postawa estetyczna, literacka i poetycka (Aesthetic, Literary and Poetic Attitudes)*, "Sprawozdanie Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności", vol. 38, 1933, no. 5, pp. 3-7.

¹³ J. O. U r m s o n : *What makes a situation aesthetic*, "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society", supplem. vol. 31, 1957.

¹⁴ V. T o m a s : *Aesthetic vision*, "The Philosophical Review", vol. 68 January 1959, p. 52-67.

¹⁵ F. S i b l e y : *Aesthetics and the Looks of Things*, "The Journal of Philosophy", vol. 56, 1956 and his: *Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic*, "The Philosophical Review", vol. 74, 1965, p. 135-159.

¹⁶ W o l t e r s t r o r f f : *Art in Action*, p. 157-160.


¹⁷ K i v y : *The Corded Shell*, p. 115-117.

with the earlier, the contemporaneous and the following paintings. In the appraisal of the artistic value of a work it is both important whether this is an original, a forgery or a fake and whether the work offers novel solutions of the fundamental artistic problems in a given realm of art. The aesthetic and artistic values of pictures do not necessarily have to overlap. Technically perfect copies, masterly forgeries and fakes can have the same aesthetic value like the originals by great masters, with a minimal or non-existent artistic value. There were also cases in the art history when artistically great or significant works had a minimal or non-existent aesthetic value (Picasso's *Demoiselles d'Avignon* and Conceptual art respectively).¹⁸

Ideally, a picture should have the highest artistic and aesthetic values at the same time as is the case with the pictures by Rembrandt or Mondrian. There are, however, epochs when one of these two essential values in art tends to be largely neglected. The academicism of the nineteenth century combined an emphasis on aesthetic perfection with a neglect of artistic innovation. On the other hand, the contemporary avant-garde absolutizes the value of innovation and originality, with a total indifference towards aesthetic values. Kulka contends that at least a minimal presence of the two component values is necessary for an object to qualify as a work of art.

A *sui generis* conclusion of comments, propositions and reflections of Kivy's and Kulka's has been made, precisely and systematically, by Göran Hermeren, who enlarged them with his own observations and with a thorough analysis and an attempt to arrange the problems and standpoints on the artistic and the aesthetic values and evaluations of art.¹⁹ Similarly to M. C. Beardsley Hermeren reduces the aesthetic to the perceivable and, after P. Kivy, reserves the concept of aesthetic evaluation for the evaluation that pertains to the "sensuous" and structural values of the work. Like Kivy (and unlike Beardsley), Hermeren also believes that it is necessary to distinguish the artistic values from the aesthetic values of the work of art. In his view, it is extremely difficult to ascertain a permanent relation between the aesthetic and the artistic values of art because the concept of artistic value has constantly changed over the centuries. Aesthetic value was regarded as a major criterion of artistic value, but not always and not by all. Besides aesthetic value, the criteria included skill and craftsmanship, communication of feelings, moral, political or religious relevance, and originality.

The possible relations between the aesthetic and the artistic values can be presented, in Hermeren's view, through a diagram which consists of two overlapping circles, one symbolizing the aesthetic values, the other the artistic values.



As a result there are three possible groups (categories) of objects, two of which pertain to the works of art. Category *a* comprises non-artistic objects (i.e. devoid of artistic value), which are, however, characterized by aesthetic value e.g. bones, stones, landscapes and animals. Group *b* covers objects possessing both the artistic and the aesthetic value e.g.

¹⁸ Kulka: *The Artistic and Aesthetic Value of Art*, p. 336–350.

¹⁹ Hermeren: *Aspect of Aesthetics*, p. 58–72.

pictures by Breughel, Titian, Rousseau and others. Category *c* is made up of works of art with the artistic but no aesthetic value, e.g. Duchamp's *Bottle-drier*, Kosuth's *One and Three Chairs* or Ken Friedman's *Distance between This Sentence and Your Eyes is My Sculpture*.

Without entering a discussion on the definition of artistic value, Hermeren distinguishes three conceptions of deciding the question of relations between aesthetic value and artistic value.

A. The standard conception, according to which aesthetic value is a component of artistic value.

B. The avant-garde conception, according to which aesthetic value is not-a component of artistic value.

C. The open conception, according to which aesthetic value can but need not be a component of artistic value.

Hermeren is inclined to accept conceptions B and C because most of the recognized art of the present day (Ludic Art, Body art, Conceptual art and various happenings) is treated seriously by the art world despite a lack of aesthetic values in this art.

I believe that Hermeren's diagram gives an adequate presentation of the possible relations between the aesthetic and artistic values. Very inspiring and cognitively valuable is also Hermeren's typology of the three essential conceptions of the relations between the aesthetic and the artistic values. But I do not think that this classification is complete.

I think that five essential positions could be distinguished that pertain to the relations between the artistic and the aesthetic values of art, and the corresponding ways of art evaluation. In distinguishing them, I will largely use Hermeren's terminology.

1. Standard conception I, which assumes that although the range of aesthetic values is generally wider than that of artistic values (because the former also exist outside art), there obtains a relation of identity between artistic value and aesthetic value in art. Those who espouse this conception believe that artistic value can be reduced to the aesthetic value of the work of art. If an artifact aspiring to be art has no aesthetic values, it cannot be recognized as a work of art. For aesthetic experience is the direct test of the aesthetic and also the artistic value of a work. This view is professed, I believe, by M. C. Beardsley²⁰, H. Osborne²¹, or J. Stolnitz²².

2. Standard conception II. Between the concept of "aesthetic value" and the concept of "artistic value" there is a relation of overlapping. For aesthetic values are not typical of art alone. In art, the case is different: although aesthetic value is the necessary condition for a work of art, the aesthetic value of a work is only a component of its artistic value. Aesthetic experience, which is a test of the aesthetic value of the work of art and the basis for its aesthetic evaluation, is not at all a test of its total artistic value. Nor is

²⁰ Cf. M. C. Beardsley: *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* New York 1958 and his: *The Aesthetic Point of View*, "Metaphilosophy", vol. 1, 1970, no. 1, p. 39-58.

²¹ Cf. for example, H. Osborne: *What is a work of art?* "British Journal of Aesthetics", vol. 21, 1981, p. 3-11.

²² Cf. J. Stolnitz: *Artistic values in aesthetic experience*, "Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism", vol. 32, 1973, p. 5-15.

aesthetic experience the necessary and sufficient basis of artistic evaluation. Artistic evaluation can be at least partly independent of aesthetic experience. This position is represented by Kivy, Kulka or Wolterstorff. But they were not the first to voice it. The first representative of this view was a Polish aesthetician and sociologist, Stanisław Ossowski, who first distinguished the artistic values of art from its aesthetic values in his fundamental book *Foundations of Aesthetics* as early as 1933. He observed that objects that aesthetics deals with are in some cases evaluated with regard to the *experiences involved in their perception*, in others with regard to the creative effort which gave birth to a given object. However, these two conceptions of value and evaluation are confused in actual practice. In aesthetic evaluation the genetic aspect (creative effort) and the functional one (the effect on the perceivers) should be thus distinguished. Ossowski writes, "We have two entirely different conceptions of value: we ascribe a value to objects, either in view of how they arose or in view of what they give us"²³; we evaluate them in the light of their causes (the creator's activity) or their effects (the perceiver's experiences). "These two methods of evaluation in aesthetics might be called, briefly, valuation with respect to beauty and valuation with respect to artistry."²⁴ Consequently, we must assume the existence of two basic varieties of what we call aesthetic value in the broad sense of the term: the value of the aesthetic object, whose measure is to be found in the aesthetic experiences of the perceiver (this value may characterize both natural phenomena and man-made objects) and the artistic value, measured by the creator's artistry (this value can characterize only man's activity). These two conceptions of value, however, are distinguished neither in popular evaluations nor in theoretical considerations. As a result, according to Ossowski, in contemporary European cultural milieu "aesthetic value" functions as a "collage of concepts" since important correlations exist between them. The aesthetic experience of the recipient is often the test of the fruitfulness of creative effort, and the appreciation of the craftsmanship may enrich and intensify, and sometimes even stimulate, aesthetic experiences (admiration for artistry).

Thus, the realm of aesthetic values is neither uniform nor homogeneous. It is both possible and necessary to distinguish two distinct types of values: 1. Those connected only with art – artistic values; and 2. aesthetic values, proper to all objects, including works of art, evoking aesthetic attitudes and aesthetic experiences. The former are in fact objective in nature, since they are tested by such properties of the work of art as can be established objectively (e.g., originality of conception, degree of technical difficulty, perfection of performance, functionality, faithful reproduction of reality, etc.)²⁵. The valuation of the work of art with regard to its artistic values does not have to depend on aesthetic experience, though it requires competence and connoisseurship, which do not characterize every recipient of art. Consequently, we can say, according to Ossowski that artistic values are aristocratic, on the other hand, aesthetic values are democratic because their only test is aesthetic experience²⁶. However, they are not objective but objective-

²³ S. Ossowski: *The Foundations of Aesthetics*. Warszawa and Dordrecht 1978, p. 301–302.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 322–23.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

-subjective (relational) in nature. They can be reduced neither to the properties of the object nor to the experiences of the subject: they are a result of a definite correlation between certain properties of the object and the experience of the subject.

Although Ossowski, Kulka and Kivy are regarded as representing one position, it does not follow that their conceptions are identical. One of the major differences is that Kivy and especially Wolterstorff understand artistic values in the broad sense while Ossowski and Kulka in the narrow sense. For example, Ossowski does not question the moral, religious or political values of art, yet he believes that they are not components of artistic value though they have a significant influence upon the global (social) value of art.

3. Phenomenological conception represented primarily by Roman Ingarden and his followers. Roman Ingarden distinguishes aesthetic and artistic evaluations. This distinction is fundamentally based on the differentiation of artistic values, which are connected with the work of art as a schematic artifact that in this particular form is aesthetically neutral, and aesthetic values, which appear in the aesthetic concretization of the work of art: that is, in the aesthetic object.²⁷ In aesthetic experience we can have direct and intuitive contact with aesthetic values, which are qualitative in nature. Artistic values, on the other hand, are not qualitative phenomena but, according to Ingarden, specific capacities of the work of art that cannot be discovered in direct aesthetic experience; nor is it possible to have intuitive contact with them. However, it may be concluded that they exist as a definite capacity of the work of art on the basis of a series of aesthetically valuable concretizations of the work²⁸. Artistic values are reducible to the twofold capacity of the work of art as a schematic artifact: 1. the capacity to evoke aesthetic experience; and 2. the capacity to form the basis for constituting the aesthetic object and the aesthetic values connected with it. Thus, artistic values are instrumental in nature, like the work of art itself, which, according to Ingarden, is only a tool used in the constitution of a valuable aesthetic object. The artistic value of the work of art is proportionate to the aesthetic values of its possible concretizations, which occur under suitable conditions, and, perhaps, to the heterogeneity of those concretizations²⁹.

The differentiation of aesthetic and artistic evaluations is the consequence of these fundamental discriminations in Ingarden's aesthetics. The difference between the two types of evaluation can be briefly formulated in the following way. Aesthetic evaluation concerns the aesthetic values of a definite concretization of the work of art and is inseparably correlated with aesthetic experience as it finds its primary expression in a direct emotional response to value; intellectual aesthetic evaluation is only its secondary expression.

Artistic evaluation is not directly connected with aesthetic experience, even though it

²⁷R. Ingarden: *Artistic and aesthetic values*, "British Journal of Aesthetics", vol. 4, 1984, no. 3, p. 198-213.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 212 and see also his: *Zasady epistemologicznego rozważania doświadczenia estetycznego (Principles of Epistemological Consideration of Aesthetic Experience)* [in:] *Studia z estetyki*, 3, Warszawa 1970, p. 1970.

²⁹R. Ingarden: *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego (On the Cognition of the Literary Work of Art)* [in:] *Studia z estetyki*, 1, Warszawa 1966, p. 240.

usually relies on aesthetic experience or, rather, experiences. It is only expressed in the form of artistic judgments and ought to serve the grasping of the artistic value of the work of art itself. The formulation of a valid artistic judgment is, according to Ingarden, a more difficult task than passing a judgment on the aesthetic value of a given concretization. "A valid artistic evaluation can only be made by someone who possesses a survey of possible concretizations of the work."³⁰ Because we can never take all possible concretizations into account, artistic evaluations are always approximate. Their validity is limited, since artistic evaluation is as a rule only partly substantiated.³¹

4. The avant-garde conception, according to which neither aesthetic value is a component of artistic value nor artistic value is a means of evoking aesthetic experience and giving anyone aesthetic satisfaction. The most radical proponents of this view believe that defining art in terms of aesthetic qualities is wrong not only with regard to avant-garde art – aesthetic values had never any significance for art. Aesthetic experience cannot be the basis of evaluation of the work of art, since we do not know at all what this experience is. The concept of "aesthetic experience" is one of the most nebulous categories of traditional aesthetics. The views of George Dickie and Arthur Danto are, I believe, closest to this conception.

5. The open conception. Aesthetic value may or may not be one of the components of artistic value. The practice of the most recent art demonstrates that it is possible to have works of art which are entirely or almost entirely devoid of aesthetic values. This was not and is not always the case, and this does not always have to be. Art is a cultural phenomenon and is ultimately determined by the historical-cultural context.

Not only the values termed art-historical by Kulka are dependent on the cultural context, but also aesthetic values and experiences, since our aesthetic sensitivity, our tastes, our views on the importance of aesthetic values and experiences undergo changes in the hierarchy of values we recognize. This conception is espoused by G. Hermeren and T. Binkley and seems most cogent and best substantiated.

The acceptance of the proposed distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic values of art is thus desirable not only with respect to the de-aestheticizing tendencies of the most recent artistic avant-garde. It permits to solve some of the puzzling questions like the aesthetic value of forgeries and fakes in art and I hope that it will allow us to put in order many problems in aesthetics and dispose of some of the apparent difficulties concerning both the theory of art and aesthetic phenomena.

If the aesthetic values of art are to constitute the same class of values as the aesthetic values of non-artistic phenomena (the beauty of nature, man's non-artistic products, and the human body), then we cannot eliminate aesthetic experiences from the process of aesthetic evaluation. Aesthetic experience is somehow *ex definitione* connected with the realm of aesthetic phenomena. Art has always been one of the most important sources of aesthetic experiences, and that is why it has been evaluated from the aesthetic point of view. Despite the significant changes that have occurred in the art of the twentieth

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ R. Ingarden: *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, Evanston, Ill, 1973, p. 415–16.

century, art as a whole has not ceased to be the source of aesthetic satisfaction for its perceivers; thus aesthetic evaluation in the narrow sense (in connection with aesthetic experience) continues to be justified. However, it is also true that some acknowledged works of contemporary art do not really provide any aesthetic gratification, or provide it only to very few perceivers, without losing their status as artistic works. That is why some aestheticians like J. Fisher³² and P. Graff³³ are not wrong when they maintain that we can and may evaluate the work of art as a work of art, making no reference to aesthetic experiences.

I believe that we have only two possibilities here: we can expand our understanding of the concept of "aesthetic phenomena" and "aesthetic evaluation" so much that they will lose their original meaning and specificity; or we can accept the fact that aesthetic values (in the narrow sense proposed by Ossowski, Kivy, Kulka, Hermeren, and others) are not the only essential and specific values of art. The acceptance of the latter solution and acknowledgment that the kind of evaluation that Ossowski and Kulka call artistic is also possible and justified leads to the recognition that aesthetic evaluation (in the narrow sense) is not the only legitimate way of evaluating art as a specific and relatively autonomous form of creativity.

Although the dominant view in the most recent philosophy of art (T. Binkley, A. Danto, G. Dickie, N. Goodman³⁴, J. Margolis and others) is that it is necessary to abandon the futile attempts of defining art in perceptual terms and to characterize it as a cultural phenomenon, I do not think that we should abandon such essential problems of traditional aesthetics as the specificity of aesthetic experience. When we realize that the authentic and specific values of art are not reducible to aesthetic values, and experiences evoked by art are not exclusively aesthetic in the narrow and strict sense of the term, then we may be able to characterize accurately not only art (this task, I think, has been largely accomplished) but also aesthetic values and experiences. Even if we acknowledge that the aesthetic nature of art is a myth, it does not follow that aesthetic objects, values and experiences are a myth as well.

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł poświęcony jest kwestii odróżnienia estetycznego i artystycznego wartościowania sztuki. Wartościowanie estetyczne dotyczy nie tylko dzieł sztuki lecz także przedmiotów naturalnych i pozartystycznych twórców człowieka. Przedmiotem oceny są tu postrzegane bezpośrednio lub wyobrażone wyglądy przedmiotu (jego zmysłowe i strukturalne własności). Wartościowanie tego typu związane jest nierozdzielnie z doznawaniem przeżycia estetycznego, które jest podstawą i kryterium wartościowania.

³² Cf. J. Fisher: *Evaluation without enjoyment* "Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism", vol. 27, 1968, no. 2, p. 135-39.

³³ See P. Graff: *O rodzajach braku związku między przeżyciem estetycznym a oceną estetyczną* (*On the kinds of lack of connection between aesthetic experience and aesthetic evaluation*), "Studia Estetyczne", vol. 7, 1970, p. 45-54.

³⁴ N. Goodman: *The Languages of Art*, Indianapolis and New York, 1968.

Nie jest to jednak jedyna forma wartościowania uprawniona wobec sztuki i dotycząca jej autentycznych i swoistych wartości. Drugą formą wartościowania jest wartościowanie artystyczne, które dotyczy nie tyle perceptualnych własności dzieła, co jego miejsca w historii sztuki, jego roli w rozwijaniu, przełamywaniu i tworzeniu nowych konwencji artystycznych. Przedmiotem oceny są tu m.in. takie zależne od kontekstu historycznego i kulturowego walory dzieła jak jego: realizm, wierność konwencji, oryginalność, nowatorstwo, kunszt wykonania itp., które mogą być dostrzeżone i docenione w postawie czysto poznawczej, bez doznawania przeżycia estetycznego. Odróżnienie tych dwóch sposobów wartościowania dzieł sztuki jest konieczne nie tylko ze względu na tendencje deestetyzacyjne w sztuce najnowszej (w szczególności w plastyce i muzyce), lecz także dlatego, że przeżyć wzbudzanych przez takie dziedziny sztuki jak literatura, teatr, film itp. nie można sprowadzić do przeżyć estetycznych wąsko rozumianych a autentycznych i swoistych wartości tych dziedzin sztuki do wartości estetycznych w wąskim i ścisłym tego słowa znaczeniu. Przyjęcie proponowanego rozróżnienia pozwala również rozwiązać takie trudne problemy estetyki jak status estetyczny kopii, fałszerstw, naśladownictw artystycznych oraz status artystyczny dzieł sztuki pozbawionych walorów estetycznych i takich dziedzin sztuki, w których przestaje istnieć przedmiot artystyczny (sztuka konceptualna).

РЕЗЮМЕ

В данной работе автор стремится представить различия выступающие между эстетическим и артистическим значением искусства. Эстетическое значение относится не только к произведениям искусства, но также к естественным предметам и внеартистическим творениям человека. Предметом оценки являются здесь замеченные или воображенные виды предмета (его чувственные и структурные свойства). Достоинство этого типа неразрывно связано с впечатлением эстетического переживания, которое является основой и критерием значения.

Однако это не единственная форма определения значения применяемая в искусстве и относящаяся к ее подлинным и своеобразным значениям. Второй формой определения значения является артистическое значение, которое касается не только воспринимающих свойств произведения, но и его место в истории искусства, его роли в развитии, преодолении и создании новых артистических манер. Предметом оценки являются здесь в частности такие зависящие от исторического и культурного контекста достоинства произведения, как: реализм, преданность манере, оригинальность, новаторство, мастерство изготовления итд., которые могут быть замечены и оценены в чисто познавательном виде, не учитывая эстетического переживания. Отличие этих двух способов оценки произведений искусства необходимо не только из-за действующих тенденций в новейшем искусстве (особенно в изобразительном искусстве и музыке), но и потому, что переживания вызваны такими областями искусства как литература, театр, фильм итд. не возможно свести к эстетическим переживаниям узко понятым, так как аутентичные и своеобразные качества этих областей искусства к эстетическому качеству в узком и точном значении слова. Принятие предлагаемого разграничения позволяет решить такие трудные проблемы эстетики как эстетический статус копии, фальсификации, художественных подражательств, а также художественный статус произведений искусства лишенных эстетических достоинств в таких областях искусства, в которых перестает существовать артистический предмет.