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**The Category of Historical Background
as a Component in Ludwik Krzywicki's Model of Historical Process**

Kategoria historycznego podłoża jako składowa modelu procesu dziejowego
w refleksji historiozoficznej Ludwika F. Krzywickiego

Категория исторического основания как составная часть модели исторического
процесса в историософических размышлениях Людвика Кшивицкого

I

Ludwik Krzywicki as a philosopher and sociologist does not equal F. Znaniecki¹ or B. Malinowski² in international fame, yet this is not at all due to the intellectual shallowness of his thought. If Krzywicki had published his paper in one of the "official" languages like English, French or German, the influence of his views would have been much wider and would have won him the renown that the other two scholars enjoy. This statement is justified by the studies, carried only recently, on the work of Krzywicki,³ especially on his developed and synthetic

* Ludwik Franciszek Krzywicki (1859—1941), a sociologist and a student of economics and history of social system, of ethnography and ethnology. Studied in Leipzig, Zurich and in Paris. In 1891 he carried investigations in the U.S. He was director of the Institute of Social Systems in Warsaw and directed the research on these problems at the Warsaw University between World War I and II.

¹ The most important works are: *Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Boston 1918—21, *The Method of Sociology*, New York 1934, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*, New York 1940.

² *Man and Culture. An Evolution of the Work of Malinowski*, London 1957 contains bibliography and a list of articles devoted to him.

³ S. Dziamski: *Zarys polskiej filozoficznej myśli marksistowskiej 1878—1939*, Warszawa 1974.

theoretical constructions like e.g. "migration of ideas in space and time". Without offering comprehensive solutions, I would like to present some consequences of my studies on Krzywicki's reflections.⁴ I have chosen a model approach here because in his voluminous work Krzywicki has developed a certain model which, although not presented explicitly, can be clearly distinguished on a certain level of his reflections. This is a model where the migration of ideas is only an element. The model is founded on the complex of two multi-element systems characterized by feed-back. While speaking of systems, we shall introduce two corresponding categories: a) material social being, b) social consciousness. We shall try to explain their structure and internal relations in the discussion that follows.

II

When reconstructing the concept of material being from Krzywicki's works⁵, we can see that it consists of the following elements:

1. The most important factor is the way of obtaining means of life. At the lowest levels of social development this can be collecting or hunting. At the higher levels this is complex and organized production.

2. The next element, closely connected with the former, is to be found in the forms of distribution of manufactured products. Krzywicki includes in it all the mechanisms and institutions of socio-economic and political-legal life, formed by man and participating in the processes of production and distribution. They comprise a set of objectified products of man's work which can be defined as economic infra-structure (a network of roads, bridges etc.) and also the institutions and installations of social infra-structure, like hospitals or orphanages, which also participate in the re-distribution of the produced goods. All this is for Krzywicki a closely connected complex of elements determining the conditions and modes of human existence.

The above elements in Krzywicki's conception make up a set of factors which can be defined as social being *sensu stricto*. The concept of being *sensu largo* would additionally comprise other elements which could be divided into two groups: a) geographical factors, b) demographic factors. This requires a word of explanation.

⁴ W. Grądkowski: *Krzywicki — czyli o pewnej propozycji rozumienia zjawisk świadomości społecznej*, "Studia Silozoficzne" 1978, 10.

⁵ The reconstruction is based on the following papers: *Dobory społeczne, Czynniki rozwoju, Szkice ekonomiczne, Twórczość a konkurencja, Rozwój kultury materialnej, więzi społecznej i poglądu na świat, Wstęp do historii ruchów społecznych*. All published in L. S. Krzywicki: *Dzieła*, Warszawa 1957—61.

A) Krzywicki treats the process of production as man's active "entry" into Nature. In this conflict, Krzywicki believes, much depends on the "force of impact", but just as much on the resistance men encounter. This force of impact can be strengthened by such factors as the number of people or the density of population. They are also an element of the conditions of material being and, without absolutizing them as particular elements, Krzywicki will maintain that they can play a major role, especially when connected with other elements of that being. These factors also embrace historically variable forms of human agglomeration.

B) The above "resistance" of Nature depends to some extent on geographical conditions. Human communities are active in the territories characterized by specific properties of climate, soil or resources. As Krzywicki stresses, these conditions, especially at lower levels of social development, can largely restrict the possibilities of existence, or at least modify other elements, of social being. These processes are reflected, in Krzywicki's view, also in social consciousness.

Therefore Krzywicki treats social being as a system consisting of many elements. In general, it comprises all that is specifically human (because created or processed by man) and that is reflected in one way or another in man's thoughts, images and aspirations. Both the content and form of these thoughts and aspirations are not insensitive to the changes in the whole system or in its particular infra-structures. The content of consciousness is for Krzywicki a reflection of the conditions of being, whereby this content is diversified at least on account of the diversity of being.

An element that diversifies consciousness is also the fact that the process of developing social consciousness cannot be reduced to any process of reflecting the objective conditions of being only through individual cognitive subjects. The failure to recognize the phenomenon of the non-identity of individual and social consciousness is, Krzywicki believes, one of the reasons of the tragedy of eminent personalities with highly developed consciousness who do not, at the same time, take into account the differences between "their ideas" and "social ideals".⁶

Krzywicki thus seems to point out a certain range of epistemological problems that are worth noting. One problem is the discrepancy between individual consciousness, a product of the individual cognitive subject, and the products of the social or group cognitive subject, that is all forms of social consciousness. Krzywicki shares the general conviction that the essential object of study in social sciences should be "a concrete man — the point of departure I find appealing"⁷, as he wrote. Since it is not sharply defined, this concept of "concrete man", poses some

⁶ *Studia socjologiczne*, Warszawa 1923, p. 9.

⁷ *Dzieta*, vol. 2, p. 335.

problems with an unequivocal estimate. However, even in Krzywicki's conception this man is not only a conscious human individual with definite needs and realizing the process of their satisfaction. It is also a specific product of the society, although Krzywicki warns us that the concept of society and its derivatives should not be absolutized too much. He holds that an individual man is not separate from the perspective of his existence within social existence but these individual perspectives; which Krzywicki stresses, constitute the general system. It is the „concrete man” that contributes certain individual goals to social consciousness which are not purposeful in themselves but precisely because they contain those individual elements. Krzywicki was therefore convinced that that kind of subjectivism was not only impossible to avoid but should naturally be contained in the results of social cognition. Yet despite individual perspectives contained in it, social consciousness must not, be reduced either to these individual cognitive results or to their sum total. It is a qualitatively new system and it requires instruments of investigation other than those used with individual facts. Krzywicki cautions that a social fact eludes the estimate formulated by sciences dealing e.g. with the individual psyche.⁸ This warning is worth noting because Krzywicki strongly stresses the fact, possibly suggesting an entirely different point of view, that the broadly-conceived theory of cognition should also comprise the knowledge of both the biological and psychical mechanisms of the individual. Only then is it possible to determine the character and types of human needs that mark the directions of activity, and thereby of the cognition of reality. At the same time Krzywicki poses a certain problem in his mind, which he formulates as questions about the essence of the interdependence of the above two mechanisms: "it is possible to determine only objective conditions, outside man, in which for example happiness is probable. What should be named the higher level of individual development?"⁹ Or elsewhere "...when we speak about our inner 'I', about our self-consciousness, manifestations of will and feeling, we can with all probability suppose that spiritual phenomena are co-ordinate with material changes in the nervous system. Yet again it is in order to ask about the essence of this interdependence."¹⁰ Thus assuming that in cognitive processes consciousness is only a function of some form of material being, Krzywicki stresses the fact that it cannot be identified with this being. Although they have biological foundations, the processes of consciousness are qualitatively distinct. The problem posed by Krzywicki can therefore be presented as follows. Consciousness

⁸ E.g. considerations on the essence of the "social occurrence", *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁹ *Dzieta*, vol. 2, p. 181.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 197 and S. Dziamski: *Zarys...*, p. 140.

is the information which regulates action and which has developed in the cognitive process. The contents of consciousness are material phenomena while their carrier, at least for some time, is the mind. A question therefore arises which could be called the problem of translatability of one sphere into the other. This is of paramount importance for the adequacy of cognition. Krzywicki sees the problem but points it out rather than solve it. He lacked the Marxist key to the solution — the category of *praxis*. Therefore, he asks rather than gives an exhaustive answer. Nevertheless, Krzywicki understood consciousness as directly connected with man's conceptual and linguistic orientation in the existing reality. He treats man's knowledge and convictions and their corresponding emotions as conditioned by the social existence of men, including the instruments accordingly developed that make it possible to impart information to one another. That he took into account social and historical factors in the process of the formation of consciousness and of the type of human feelings¹¹ was clearly emphasized in Krzywicki's views. He therefore was aware of the social context of cognitive processes.

According to Krzywicki the internal structure of social consciousness is fundamentally determined by the class system of the society because this is the most essential order of both human co-operation and counter-action. This does not mean that this order is the only one that defines such actions. Krzywicki considers that it is necessary and possible to investigate orders of action with narrower ranges e.g. at a larger scale — nation, and at a smaller scale — occupation, because they also mark the relatively coherent structures of consciousness. However, he stresses that these analyses cannot dispense with a class analysis because the structures in question are in a way "superimposed" on the basic one.

The problems of the origin and internal structure of the processes of consciousness, assumed by Krzywicki, deserve closer investigation. For the purpose of this paper we will confine ourselves to the following ascertainments. In his view, these processes are characterized by the great diversity of both their content and form. Consciousness as a total system is thus dynamic while its dynamics results from the diversity of particular elements which constitute social consciousness and from their interactions. Movement is therefore present inside the whole system. At the same time this system consists of such a connection of particular elements that a change in any of them results in changes in the others. Since the whole system is internally conditioned by the structure of connections of its particular elements, their changes result in the change of the whole system. Movement is thus not only an im-

¹¹ S. Dziamski: *Zarys...*, p. 140.

manent feature of the system but in a way its "external" characteristic. Analogous reasoning applied to consciousness, which is treated as a system, can be referred to social being, also treated as a system. Then, in a complex of those two systems a characteristic feature will be their changeability towards one another. This duality is dynamic: it means further movement — exchange between the systems. This exchange rests on consecutive sequence: first one system gives, the other receives; then the other gives, and the former receives. Each element in this exchange is replaced by another and eventually negated by something else. During this exchange the two elements are active towards each other.

To avoid the accusation of theoretical speculation we shall try to substantiate this by quoting Krzywicki.¹² "The system of everyday life especially the sphere of production, is spontaneously transformed and in the process of becoming it is a permanent revolutionary (...). Idea appears on the historical scene as a reflection of the results of this development in the conditions of material being, as the formulations of new needs generated by the progress of productive forces. It is a derivative, secondary factor."¹³ However, after some time the idea "...appears as a primary, independent factor by whose emergence it is ahead of the facts of life, at least of some, and it accelerates their occurrence (...). Under the influence of consciousness directed towards the satisfaction of everyday needs and interests, new powers of production develop in society and place a section of the nation in a new environment. They offer new aspirations to these people and eventually give rise to new social institutions. In this period (of social dialectic), consciousness becomes a factor of paramount importance."¹⁴ Further on, Krzywicki also writes "Every social institution in whatever form is nothing but an idea which is turned into the body from the word, transformed into a permanent arrangement from a slogan. The forms of ownership and government, the contents of civil codes, marital and family relations, the concepts of dignity and of personal honour, or moral norms all had to force."¹⁵ Finally he writes "this system of life which transforms itself spontaneously and the ideas to which it gave birth carry with them the principle of revolution i.e. they behave as active powers in the historical development."¹⁶

¹² L. Krzywicki: *Studia...*, p. 40.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

These somewhat lengthy quotations from Krzywicki's works are to have a dual role. First, they illustrate the train of thought presented above, second — they make it possible to continue it (and thereby to try to reconstruct) in the direction which, I believe, has been marked off in Krzywicki's works. An attempt to reconstruct it goes as follows.

We have ascertained that being and consciousness in this model are connected with each other into one system. The consequence of this connection is mutual interaction and even intermingling. We could attempt to present this relationship in the formula of "being shapes up conscious being". Consciousness would thus be a form of existence or a phase of movement of this being. Consequently, social being is also consciousness in motion, the consciousness which became objectified in and enriched this material being without, however, stopping in its motion. Thus, there is a continuous turnover between the two systems. The quicker it is, the greater advantages it brings to both systems because the mutual exchange takes place faster enriching both of them and thereby the whole. The ideal would be the fastest turning to reduce the exchange time to a minimum. It is here that the problem of time arises. This problem was signalled several times in the foregoing quotations from Krzywicki's work. As we have already said this exchange entails consecutive sequence. Consecutive, particular systems are exchanged one after another. Exchange means reciprocity but its perfect symmetry is not possible because exchange requires time which is dissymmetric. This produces significant consequences for the process of exchange.

Let us analyze the point of departure in the model under reconstruction. Consciousness is always the consciousness of something, or, more precisely, the information about the conditions of material being. Therefore, it is genetically posterior to the occurrences of material being. The reflection of the conditions of being in consciousness is the first stage of exchange between the two system. This exchange requires a certain amount of time. The essential realization of consciousness is fulfilled while it is used as a factor regulating human behaviour. This takes place through the introduction of consciousness into practical action, that is into the sphere of social being. And this is the second stage which closes the cycle of movement existing between the two systems. This stage also takes some time and as a result the cycle of exchange: being — consciousness — conscious being requires a definite interval of time. During this time interval there simultaneously takes place the exchange inside the elements that make up material being. In the initial situation under discussion the first cycle of exchange happens very fast between the two systems. It is so fast that the movement of elements inside being itself is relatively slow and has not enough time to be changed by the structure

of this system. For that reason the information we are realizing, transferring it from the sphere of consciousness to practical action, has had not enough time to become obsolete. The result is that our activity based on correct information is effective. Or more precisely, still effective. Consciousness realized in material activity becomes objectified. The efficacy of this action prevents us from regarding this objectification as single. We are apt to treat it as a universal stereotype of action. Thus, when we receive similar information in the next cycles of exchange between being and consciousness, we respond to it by an identical stereotype of action. It must be observed that the items of information are only similar whereas the stereotypes of action are identical. The items of information are similar because being undergoes changes in its elements while the standard form of material activity freezes into a custom. A custom is a long-lasting type of behaviour. This long duration results in a process which could be called "a stop of time". Custom brings time to "a standstill". It apprehends a certain moment and holds it, as it were, in material activity which has become a routine. But this routine stereotype is situated on the borderline between two systems. It is objectified consciousness and by bringing time to a standstill, it impedes the exchange between being and consciousness. The only foundation of such forms of behaviour can be found in neither currently realized moral values nor scientific reasons. This foundation is a sufficiently long repetition so far, a duration in time. The argument that "such is the tradition" slowly outweighs all other counter-arguments. Krzywicki is aware of the problem: "This is an old custom" is an argument which no proofs based on logic are able to counter (...). This veneration of the tradition of the ancestors was an impregnable barrier for the development of productive powers (...). The most important technological inventions were accepted with reluctance, every new attempt to subjugate nature had to overcome prejudice."¹⁷ Tradition is thus a strengthening element in the argument for a stereotype used. The old impart it to the young and with time the problem "who imparted?" becomes more important than the question about what was imparted. Krzywicki wrote, "Tradition becomes the instance to which we turn as to the chief argument."¹⁸

It should be borne in mind that all those phenomena resulted from the analysis of the assumed initial situation in the model. A characteristic feature of this situation was the completion of only one cycle of exchange between being and consciousness. Further exchanges take place together with the existing objectified stereotypes of action which are gradually strengthened by tradition. All this corresponds, according to Krzywicki,

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

to the earlier epochs of historical development where "...the source of inertia at that time was not in man but in the efficacy, permanence and routine of the material conditions of being."¹⁹ The situation changes on the higher level of social development. Further cycles of exchange take place. The content and forms of consciousness are enriched as the conditions of social being become richer and more diversified. Myth, religion, morality, art, philosophy and science gradually emerge with the development of the conditions of man's material existence. Created as the elements regulating the material behaviour of men, they slowly become differentiated and acquire new contents. Yet the feature they all share is their "objectified" character. They are "objectified" although they will with time express ideas and aspirations, they always appear in the somehow materialized form, that of rite, pictures, or books. They are in some way recorded, which makes them permanent and ready to be handed down from generation to generation. This is specifically human since other animals do not possess it but it also breeds definite dangers. This danger is the permanence of the recording which, on the one hand, allows us to make use of it for a long time, but it also threatens that the information in the recording (which is petrified) becomes obsolete. For example, moral or legal codes always contain a stereotype of activity which they prefer. These stereotypes have been tested and are effective but only over a definite period. If the codes are in force for too long, the information and stereotypes of action derived from them become obsolete. Both the information and the stereotypes are no longer adequate for the changes occurring in the sphere of material being. It would be natural if they themselves were changed as well. A complicity arises, however, because some social communities appear on the scene which found these stereotypes useful at one time and for which they are still effective. By the fact that those stereotypes are long-lasting, and strengthened by the prestige of tradition, they are again elevated to the standing of argument, which in a way disguises the real interest. By virtue of that, Krzywicki writes, "...tradition is the shield of the classes whose interest is to maintain the existing order. (...) Yesterday still exists in full, it confines our movements, halts our aspirations prompted by the present-day system of social relations. We live surrounded by the by-gone centuries and tied up (...). The past surrounds us everywhere. Our customs and prejudices, principles and belief (...) and further, our political and legal institutions, moral and aesthetic views, and finally our philosophical systems, all make up one coherent category in the historical development — that of historical background. This background was formed in the course of centuries: every epoch left some legacy as if in the archives.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Historical background constitutes a very important category of historical factors — a passive category”.²⁰

Thus a significant new factor appears in the model of historical process which we are reconstructing. Let us try to define it. It is also a multi-element system composed of the objectified forms of social consciousness. Although it consists of individual elements, to a degree stable, their connections within the system are changed to yield a variable combination, which determines the character of the whole system. The total character of this system is subject to changes in the course of historical process. "Historical background in its influence upon historical process has a very heterogenous physiognomy".²¹ Does this mean that Krzywicki is inconsistent when he attributes to particular elements in historical background, like customs or moral norms, a rather high stability, stressing somewhere else that the background itself is historically variable? I do not think this is the case. This inconsistency should be solved in the processes of the duration of occurrences.

In the model in question we are dealing already with three multi-element systems. They are being, consciousness, and historical background. The last element has the longest duration. Both in the other two and in the background there occur intra-systemic changes. The exchange takes place in time. The fastest are the changes in being. The exchange between the elements of consciousness is slower. That is why consciousness has a different, slower duration. The slowest are the changes in the historical background. The objectified forms contained in it have the character of stereotypes that obtain for a long time. Long does not mean permanently. Time passes here as well but so slowly that from the point of being as a dynamic system it is very long duration. We could thus say that there are three times — a separate one for each system. These different speeds of the passage of time in a sense allow Krzywicki to call the historical background a "passive" or "inert" category. Yet in his work we can also see the symptoms of a keener view on the role of historical background. As if he were contradicting his assertion about the "passive" character of this category, Krzywicki points with great insight at its active role in the historical process: "If we want to know why social ideas appear on the historical scene in a definite succession and we wish to find out where they acquired their content, we must first understand the development of productive powers. However, if we are investigating the results achieved in the end by social life of its kind, i.e. the concrete prejudices in which idea was realized, we must also take into account the influence of historical background. The same productive

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

powers in every country can and must yield different results: the bourgeois system in England has a different character from that of America or France because the background upon which the so-called bourgeoisie was freed was different each time".²²


What then is the role of historical background in the model under consideration? The historical background is situated here on the borderline between the two dynamic systems — being and consciousness. A different kind of time, this "long duration" so affects the exchange between the two systems that it is not of the character assumed in the initial model. The speed of exchange no longer depends on the internal dynamics of both systems. It also depends on the dynamics of the system which is between them. Different dynamics, different time, all this affects not only the speed of exchange between being and consciousness but also its results. Historical background is capable of accumulating layers, which can clearly be seen in some forms of objectified consciousness, e.g. the Code of Napoleon was superimposed upon the rules of Roman civil law.²³ The density of that "objectified layer" produces the diversity of reflection in social consciousness of phenomena from the sphere of material being. Some differences in the political system can emerge in a similar way, which has been pointed out by Krzywicki. As a result, this heterogeneity of historical background influences the complexity of ways in which particular forms of consciousness are reflected. And it can make the new contents very much remote from the information which we would have obtained and then realized if we had not been in a sense "burdened" by historical background. The category of historical background thus illustrates the thesis about the influence of time upon the results of cognition. In cognition, which is a kind of subject-object continuum, time is a joining link. Exchange takes place between the subject and the object. The ideal of efficient cognition would be that the exchange should occur as quickly as possible. However, the accumulation of "layers" disturbs the cycle. Consequently, the information from the sphere of object can reach the sphere of subject already distorted, narrowed, incomplete or even outdated and false. It may breed consciousness that is deformed to a certain degree or even as a whole. I believe that it is in these phenomena that we should look for a contribution to the problem of "mystified consciousness" which deserves a thorough investigation.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²³ Krzywicki carries out the analyses of the reception of Roman Law in the Napoleon Code.

III

If we tried to present the model under reconstruction as a graphic scheme, it would look as in the figure below. The symbols we have used have the following meaning: [a] denotes social being, [b] denotes social consciousness while [c] stands for the category of historical background. T denotes historical time. This scheme has been presented, as it were, in profile. We take into account the different speeds of exchange occurring between the systems. Arrows indicate the directions of exchange. This directions of exchange signal a kind of historical time.



What can we find interesting in this scheme? The structure of elements [a b c] is the "present immediacy" but it is at the same time connected with the "pastness" by historical background. Every action does not pass from [a] to [b] or from [b] to [a] but is in a way "let through" by [c], the element which cannot be by-passed. Being and consciousness are always "something that always has something behind its back".

Thus a discussion about "pure" materiality and psychicality in every instance of action is doubly pointless. First, a social fact understood in the way presented above can never be reduced to the material and the psychic. Secondly, action can never be separated from its historical context. The structure [a b c] is a recording of a fact, and it follows from this recording that this is an indissoluble continuum. One of the most interesting consequences of the functioning of this tight structure has been signalled earlier when we spoke about the "burdens" of consciousness. The problems seem rather important and deserve thorough investigation. At this point, however, we would like to signal a few more problems that merit attention in view of the reconstructed model in Krzywicki's reflection. These problems also follow from this characteristic

tight structure. For every social fact consists of the connection of the type [a b c]. Every action has therefore a mental base (element c) while every type of practice has then a kind of context or base that functions as a specific regulator of human actions. As a result, historical background plays the role of the mental base consisting of a set of historical contexts for particular types of social practice. Historical concretization would then consist in selecting from this base an element that would assure consistency with the goal assumed for all practical action. The coherence of the system [a b c] can always be obtained because this base consists of various alternative systems of convictions "locked up", as it were, in the objectified consciousness. In other words, if social practice constitutes a certain kind of a dynamic, multi-system structure with its particular types as subsystems, this historical context forms a further functional substructure of the types of practice that come into play. At this point, we shall recall the initial assumptions in the reconstructed model which have been presented earlier. The situation would be as follows. From the moment a human individual comes into its biological being, he faces a certain objective natural or natural-social reality and reflects the reality in his consciousness, which is expressed by a set of definite convictions. Then individuals "impart" these "acquired" convictions to one another, which results in the "co-ordination" of common convictions, although the mechanisms of this co-ordination are a problem too difficult to solve. This kind of solution of the problem of consciousness was very frequent in the Marxism of International II and had a character of a "common — sense" explanation.²⁴ Krzywicki shows an entirely different perspective — the one presented in the foregoing pages would be possible only in a theoretically prepared situation. First, if the individual formed his consciousness from nought, that is in the cognitively "pure" situation without any context or mental base; moreover, if the process of "co-ordination" of convictions occurred in a way on equal footing, which is to mean that the contribution of consciousness acquired by the individual would be equal to the already existing block of social consciousness. The functioning of the system of elements [a b c] shows that this is not the case. For even in the optimum case the individual consciousness in the making encounters this tightly connected objectified social consciousness and is filtered by it. This contact with the objective reality is thus specifically processed or socially programmed in the broadest sense of the term because the state of social consciousness is determinatively primary to individual consciousness. The consequence of this fact could be presented in the following way:

²⁴ E.g. K. Kautsky: *Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, Berlin 1907, p. 334 and passim.

a) the process of acquiring individual convictions is not left to themselves but it is under social control,

b) the states of objective reality do not appear as "cognitively pure states of nature" but they are always sifted through the prism of the existing and socially functioning norms of knowledge,

c) the development of social consciousness as a process consists in the historically changing modification of mechanisms that govern the social acceptance of particular ideas. That is why successive states of individual consciousness are only landmarks which, although enabling us to recognize directions, yet have been placed somewhat later.

There is not enough room here to give prominence to more trains of thought that appear in Krzywicki's philosophical reflection. It is therefore in order to recapitulate the most essential point presented so far, that is the category of "social background" which he introduced. This category marked as c in the reconstructed model has a significant part in understanding the mechanisms of historical process. This sphere, which functions as a specific "context" for all kinds of social practice, is at the same time a kind of a bridge between individual and social consciousness. It is here that the described "clash" of individual consciousness with social consciousness takes place and their processing which occurs both ways, that is, when the direction of action is from [a] to [b] and the other way round. In either case the system [c] functions as a specific filter. This system is formed by the kind of socially accepted and recorded (thus objectified) convictions that play a fact-making role at the same time. These are therefore the facts which constitute concrete practical values because, according to the whole of socially functioning convictions, they serve the realization of these values. The category of social background is thus specific because it is a fact-making sphere of social consciousness.

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł stanowi próbę zinterpretowania poglądów Ludwika Krzywickiego dotyczących przebiegu procesów dziejowych. Krzywicki, socjolog i ekonomista stworzył interesującą teorię, której oryginalność wydobywa zastosowana w tym artykule do interpretacji jego prac analiza systemowa. Ujawnia ona specyficzny model historii, oparty na założeniu, iż historię taką wyznaczają trzy podstawowe systemy powiązanych ze sobą zjawisk. Owe systemy tworzą [a] byt społeczny, [b] świadomość społeczna oraz nowa teoretycznie wprowadzona przez Krzywickiego kategoria [c] „podłoża historycznego”. Jej funkcje w trakcie zachodzących procesów historycznych są wielokierunkowe, a generalnie rzecz biorąc jest ona stymulatorem, decydującym o przebiegu i tempie tworzenia całego kompleksu zjawisk, które w literaturze przedmiotu zwykło określać się mianem „tradycji”. Tak więc Ludwik Krzy-

wicki tworzy rodzaj „teorii tradycji” a problematyka ta stosunkowo rzadko podejmowana w literaturze zarówno polskiej jak i anglosaskiej — może być ciekawa dla czytelnika.

РЕЗЮМЕ

В данной работе сделано попытку истолковать взгляды Людвика Кшивицкого на ход исторических процессов. Кшивицкий — социолог и экономист — создал интересную теорию, оригинальность которой подчеркивает использованный для интерпретации его работ системный анализ. Этот анализ обнаруживает специфическую модель истории, основанную на принципе, что такую историю определяют три основные системы объединенных явлений. Эту систему творят: а) общественный быт, б) общественное сознание и с) новая теоретически введенная Кшивицким категория „исторической основы”. Ее функция в исторических процессах разнообразная, а в принципе она является стимулятором, решающим о ходе и темпе создания целого комплекса явлений, которые в литературе носят название „традиция”. Итак, Людвик Кшивицкий создает вид „теории традиции”, а проблематика эта значительно редко выступает в литературе как польской так и англосаской, и поэтому может возбуждать интерес читателя.

the first part of the paper, the author discusses the role of the state in the development of the economy. In the second part, the author discusses the role of the market in the development of the economy. In the third part, the author discusses the role of the state in the development of the economy.

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