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Legal regime of world trade under the GATT and WTO

System prawny handlu światowego w regulacjach GATT oraz WTO

THE PURPOSE AND THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE

In this article, I examine the development and recent reconstruction of the legal framework of world trade by the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, the GATT) and the World Trade Organization (hereinafter, the WTO).

The GATT was concluded in 1947 at first as the temporal agreement regarding "Tariffs and Trade" before the Havana Charter, which had been drafted as the constituent instrument of the International Trade Organization (ITO), failed to entry into forces because of the lack of the political support at later stage by United States for the plan of the ITO. Thereafter, however, the GATT gradually developed its organization and structure as a sort of international organization and its role for the world trade became, not only strictly legally but also politically, larger and larger through 1950's to 1980's. As the result of the "Uruguay Round" negotiations in GATT from 1986 to 1994, the Marrakesh Agreement was concluded in 1994 and a new international organization for the world trade, namely the World Trade Organization, was established from 1 January, 1995. This newly-born WTO has on the one hand substantially succeeded to the assets and personnel of the GATT in Geneva, but on the other hand it has reformed its organization and structure to some extent from the GATT and particularly strengthened its dispute settlement powers.

In this paper, the development of legal regime of the GATT and WTO will be examined from the historical and legal perspective. After that, we consider the

structure and function of the WTO at the moment and especially new dispute settlement procedures under the WTO regime. As a conclusion, we consider the present functions of this new Organization and also its role for international trade in future.

THE BIRTH AND ORIGIN OF THE GATT

Based upon the reflection that the tide of protectionalism and bilateralism in the world trade after the Great Depression in 1930's had become one factor to the outbreak of the Second World War, the idea to establish an international organization for more liberal world economic order appeared mainly from the United States even during the Second World War. At the first meeting of the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) of the United Nations in February 1946, the U.S. government proposed a resolution calling for the convening of a "United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment" in order to draft a Charter for an international trade organization (1). In the area of international finance, the Agreements for the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank) were adopted at Breton Woods in New Hampshire in July 1944, and both of these two organizations became "Specialized Agencies" of the United Nations in 1947 (2). Since then, the IMF and IBRD, together with the International Finance Corporation (IFC, established in 1956) and the International Development Association (IDA, established in 1960), have been playing very active roles in world economy and international finance (3).

However, compared with the area of international finance and economy, international regime and international organization of world trade have not been developed so smoothly. From the end of 1947 to the beginning of 1948, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment was held at Havana in Cuba, and there the draft Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO) was signed. Because the initiative for this Organization mainly came from the U.S. government and the United States had the strongest power in the field of world trade also at that time, whether the U.S. would ratify this Charter or not was crucial for the actual establishment of the ITO. The U.S. government submitted the Charter of the ITO to the U.S. Congress for the ratification several times, and extensive hearings were held on it. However, in the late 1940's, the U.S. Congress became more conservative on trade issues and the support for the establishment of the ITO became less and less. At last, in December 1950, the U.S. government officially announced that it abandoned the ratification of the ITO Charter. Because of this giving up by the U.S. government for the ratification of the Charter, the establishment of the ITO has never been materialized.

The miscarriage of the plan for the ITO did not necessarily reflect, however, the actual needs for some kind of international regime or system in the area of trade in world scale. Before the Havana Conference, the preparatory committee for the Charter of the ITO had drafted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva in October 1947. This General Agreement was entered into forces on January 1st, 1948, but this Agreement had been originally considered as a part of agreement within the ITO regime as a whole. However, after it became obvious that the establishment of the ITO would never be possible, the contracting parties of this General Agreement have eventually begun to use this Agreement as a legal basis of the regulations for the world trade issues. In this way, the GATT has became a major legal regime of world trade, and it has gradually developed its organic structure and some important legal rules about the international trade. Some people have mentioned that the GATT had "birth defects" dating from this history of its origin, and these backgrounds of its birth have been casting a shadow on some serious problems facing the GATT later, which have prompted the reconstruction of the GATT into the WTO as a result of the Uruguay Round (see 4, below).

THE RULES OF THE GATT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Even if the GATT had a "provisional" character from its origin and it did not have a strong formal structure like other international organizations as the IMF and IBRD, the GATT have provided some important basic legal principles governing the trade relations between the contracting parties. These basic principles in the GATT were as follows (4).

1. Principle of Non-Discrimination

First principle which the GATT has provided is the principle of non--discrimination. This principle, in substance, implies two concrete treatments in the relationship of international trade. One is Most-Favoured Nations Treatment (MFN), which was one of the most important principles in international trade and provided in Article 1 of the GATT Agreement. Article 1 provided that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties". This MFN is the most fundamental principle for international trade, but the GATT Agreement itself has admitted some exceptions for this principle. For example, Article 24 admitted the exception for the creation of customs union and free-trade area,

which has become a political controversy for the European Community. Also Article 20 admitted the general exception for the public policy, and Article 21 admitted the exception for security reason. As many contracting parties of the GATT have invoked these escape clauses in order to avoid the granting MNF, it is difficult to assert that MNF has been actually applied to every trade relations all over the world under the GATT regime.

The other treatment derived from the principle of non-discrimination is National Treatment (NT), which was provided in Article 3 in the GATT Agreement. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 established the general principle that internal taxes and regulations "should not be applied ---- so as to afford protection to domestic production", and Paragraph 2 required NT in respect of internal taxation (such as sales taxes or value added taxes) while Paragraph 4 required NT in respect of regulations affecting the sales and use of goods generally. As for this NT also, its relationship to the general exception clause of Article 20 has been very controversial. In addition, many contracting parties have sometimes made "hidden" barriers in order to protect their own products or goods, or otherwise made some "disguised" discrimination for foreign products or goods. Therefore, a number of disputes regarding these issues have been occurred under the GATT regime.

2. General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions

Second principle of the GATT is the general elimination of quantitative restrictions. At the time when the GATT was established in 1948, such measures were widely used by many countries all over the world. Article 11 of the GATT Agreement generally prohibited the use of quantitative restrictions. However, the GATT Agreement itself permitted some exceptions for this principle. First exception is the quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural and fisheries products (Paragraph 2 (c) of Article 11). As the result of the transformation of the GATT into the WTO by the Uruguay Round, this exception has been abolished in principle under the present WTO regime. Second exception is the quantitative restrictions designed to safeguard the balance of payment (Article 12 and Section B of Article 18). Third exception is the quantitative restrictions introduced by developing countries (Section C of Article 18). Under the GATT regime, for instance, the principle of reciprocity of concessions was not applied to the developing countries (5).

This general elimination of quantitative restrictions means that the GATT has permitted customs duties as only form of protection because, unlike quantitative restrictions, customs duties clearly show the extent of protection and allow the competition. And one of the important functions of the GATT was to reduce these customs duties by a "Round", which would be mentioned later in this paper.

3. Assurance of Fair Trade: Regulation of Dumping and Subsidies

Third principle of the GATT is the assurance of fair trade. For that purpose, the GATT Agreement provided some regulations for dumping and subsidies. Firstly, Article 6 of the Agreement provided that "dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the product, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry"(Paragraph 1), and, in such case, Article 6 authorized a contracting party to impose the anti-dumping duties (Paragraph 2) or countervailing duties (Paragraph 3). However, these provisions in Article 6 were relatively brief and many procedural and substantial issues regarding anti-dumping had not been so clear. Consequently, there were a lot of efforts in the GATT to reach subsequent agreements on more specific standards for anti-dumping (6). For example, in 1967, an Agreement in Interpretation of Article 6, which has been called as "the 1967 Anti-Dumpimg Code", was signed (7).

Secondly, in order to guarantee the fair trade in international relation, the GATT Agreement provided some regulations for government subsidies in Article 16. The wordings in Article 16 are rather ambiguous (8), and the criteria between the legitimate government activities of supporting domestic industries and illegal government subsidies have been one of the most difficult issues under the GATT regime (9). Also in this area, some subsequent agreements were concluded under the GATT regime (10). The topic of the regulation for the subsidies have been one of the most controversial issues even under the present WTO regime.

4. Reduction of Tariffs and Other Non-Tariff Barriers

As mentioned above in 2, under the GATT regime, quantitative restrictions and import quotas were prohibited in principle (Article 9), and only tariffs were admitted as a legitimate measure to protect domestic industries and markets. Therefore, it was one of the most essential tasks for the GATT to reduce these tariffs and other non-tariff barriers in order to promote more free trade in international relations. This important function of the GATT to reduce tariffs and other non-tariff barriers was carried out by multilateral trade negotiations that were called "Rounds". Eight Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have been held under the GATT regime: the Geneva Round (1947), the Annecy Round (1949), the Torquay Round (1951), another Geneva Round (1956), the Dillon Round (1960–1961), the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), and most recently the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) (11). First five

Rounds dealt exclusively with tariffs reduction. From the Kennedy Round, attention began to shift towards non-tariff trade restrictions and also the trade of agricultural products. And the number of contracting parties participating in these Rounds under the GATT has been dramatically increased. In the first Geneva Round in 1947, only 23 countries participated in that Round, but 74 countries participated in the Kennedy Round, 99 countries participated in the Tokyo Round, and in the Uruguay Round 128 countries participated. In that sense, the GATT has developed to the real world-scale organization for international trade for more than 40 years.

THE URUGAY ROUND: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WTO

Mainly because of its "birth defects", the necessity for the reform of the GATT system had been recognized for a long time. For instance, since the formal amendment of the GATT Agreement was legally very difficult and actually impossible, a number of "codes" were adopted as a result of the Tokyo Round in order to regulate some kind of non-tariff measures, but contracting parties were obliged to comply only with the codes which they could accept, and, therefore, such system was called, "GATT a la carte". The institutional structure of the GATT was very ambiguous and not very strong because of the historical reason of its birth, and the vital defect of the GATT system was that it had only very limited power for the dispute settlement. A Panel procedure under the GATT regime for the settlement of a trade dispute between two contracting parties was easily blocked by the objection from one party of the dispute, and it also usually required a lot of time. And the legal validity of Panel Reports, whether they were legally binding for the parties or not, was not clear because a Panel procedure under the GATT regime was regarded, both by many contracting parties and by many scholars, as a kind of "conciliation" not as a judicial judgment.

In September 1986, a large Ministerial Meeting was held at Punta del Este in Uruguay for the purpose of starting a new trade Round. This Round is usually called the "Uruguay Round", even though most of its meetings were held in Geneva or other major national capitals. However, this Punta del Este Declaration said nothing about the establishment of a new international organization for trade to replace the GATT institution. At that time, the hottest issue for most industrialized countries, especially for the United States, was to include the topic of the regulation for services under this new Round. It was only in early 1990 that, for the first time, the official government proposal to establish a new organization, called "World Trade Organization", was made by Canada. This proposal was supported by many industrialized countries, but the position of the United States was not clear. The European Community and European countries supported the idea of the establishment of a new organization, but they

proposed the name of "Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO)" instead of the name of "World Trade Organization (WTO)". In the end of 1991, the first full draft text, called "Dunkel Text" for the name of the Director-General of the GATT at that time, Arther Dunkel, was proposed, and it contained a Charter of a new "Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO)".

After new Clinton Administration took office in January 1993, the U.S. Administration began to consider the Uruguay Round negotiations seriously, and especially for the three or four months before 15 December 1993, the date on which the authorization of "fast track" procedure by U.S. Congress to the President was expired, very intensive and hard negotiations were held between the United States and other major countries. On 15 December 1993, the U.S. government finally accepted the notion of the establishment of a new organization for trade on the condition of changing (or returning back) its name from the "MTO (Multilateral Trade Organization)" to the "WTO (World Trade Organization)". Thus, the establishment of a new international organization, called "World Trade Organization (WTO)", was substantially decided. The final Ministerial Meeting was held at Marrakesh in Morocco in April 1994, and "the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the Marrakesh Agreement)" was signed on 15 April 1994 as a final result of the Uruguay Round. Over 120 nations participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and among them 113 countries were attended at Marrakesh. This WTO Agreement was scheduled to come into forces on 1 January 1995, and, surprisingly, 76 countries had taken necessary domestic procedure to ratify or approve this Agreement before that day. There were a number of legal problems for each country regarding the domestic procedures for the approval or ratification of that Agreement, but major industrialized parties, for example, the United States, the European Community and Japan had finished such procedures before the due date (12).

Thus, fifty years after the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, an international organization for international trade was formally established as the WTO on 1 January 1995.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE WTO

1. Legal Structure of the WTO Agreements

The legal structure of the GATT had been a complex mixture of almost 200 treaty texts (protocols, amendments, etc.) and it had been always clouded by its "provisional" status and its "birth defects". As a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO Agreements were signed at Marrakesh, and the first part of these Agreements is the WTO Charter, formally called "the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization". This Charter itself is a rather short document,

which is composed of 16 Articles, but it has extensive Annexes that were the "single package" result of the Uruguay Round. The WTO Charter itself provides only institutional framework of the WTO, for example, its Scope (Article 2), Functions (Article 3), Structure (Article 4), the Secretariat (Article 6), Status (Article 8), Decision-making (Article 9), Amendments (Article 10) and Membership (Article 10–13) and so on.

This Agreement, however, has four Annexes, namely Annex 1 to Annex 4, and Annex 1 is, furthermore, composed of Annex 1A, Annex 1B and Annex 1C. Annex 1A is "Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods", all of which are mandatory and denying the "pick and choose" approach, namely "GATT a la carte" at the Tokyo Round. The first part in Annex 1A is "GATT 1994", the revised and all-inclusive GATT agreements, including "codes" and amendments which were renegotiated in the Uruguay Round. Annex 1A also contains other 11 Agreements, for instance, Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on Trade--Related Investment Measures, Agreement on Article 6 (Anti-dumping), Agreement on Rule of Origin, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Agreement on Safeguards and so on. As a result, the substantial rules and regulations of the GATT are, with adding to some new developments, fundamentally succeeded to the WTO.

Annex 1B is "General Agreement on Trade in Services", which is called "GATS", and Annex 1C is "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights", which is called "TRIPS". These two areas, namely the trade on services and the issue of trade-related intellectual Property Rights, are newly dealt with under the WTO regime, and a considerable part of the substantial rules and regulations for these issues are open for future negotiations among members of the WTO.

Annex 2 is "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes", which is often called the "DSU". This "Understanding" is also obligatory for all members of the WTO and, as a result, the WTO has integrated and unified dispute settlement procedures which are essential for the task of the Organization. Many people, including the Director-General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero, have pointed out that these dispute settlement procedures are the WTO's most important contribution to the stability of global economy because, without effective implementation and enforcement, any legal rules and rule-based organization would be worthless. These new dispute settlement procedures will be examined furthermore later.

Annex 3 provides the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), by which the WTO will review the overall trade policies of each member on a periodic or regular basis, and report on those policies. And Annex 4 contains four "optional" Agreements that provide some flexibility for new subjects like Government Procurement.

2. New Dispute Settlement Procedures under the WTO

Among the structure of the WTO regime as a whole, as mentioned before, the most significant development from the GATT regime is the new dispute settlement procedures provided in Annex 2. The new WTO dispute settlement system is at once stronger, more automatic and more credible than its GATT predecessor. This is reflected in the increasing number of the cases and the increased diversity of countries using it under the WTO dispute settlement procedures. From January 1995 to May 1998, 133 cases (and 97 discrete cases, because sometimes a complaint has multiple complainants) had been initiated under the new dispute settlement procedures of the WTO (13). As of July 1999, 175 cases (and 134 discrete cases) have been initiated and, consequently, the number of cases initiated under the WTO procedure is almost 40 cases per year. Among these 175 cases, Panels have been established in 70 cases. Therefore, on average 16 Panels have been established per year. Among these 70 cases, Panel Reports have been issued in 29 cases, and among them the appeals to the Appellate Body by one of the parties have been made in 20 cases. and the Appellate Body has issued final Reports and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has adopted final Reports in 17 cases.

It is quite remarkable that how these new dispute settlement procedures under the WTO regime have been used by many members during these five years. We can find some reasons why these new dispute settlement procedures have been used so frequently by the WTO members and achieved a considerable success.

Firstly, the WTO Agreement has established a unified dispute settlement system for all parts of the GATT/WTO regimes, including the new areas of trade on services and intellectual property rights. Therefore, sometimes WTO Panels must consider the legal problems concerning environmental matters as long as they are related with the dispute covered by the WTO Agreement. Secondly, and it might be more important in substance that these new dispute settlement procedures are far more well judicialized than its predecessor under the old GATT regime. The DSU reaffirms and clarifies that every member of the WTO has the legal right to initiate a Panel process. One of the most essential developments of the WTO dispute settlement procedures from the GATT is that some of the vital decisions during these procedures, for example, the establishment of Panel, the adoption of Panel Reports by the DSB and the adoption of Appellate Body Reports by the DSB, are made by the "negative consensus" rule. (14) Under this "negative consensus" rule, unless otherwise decided by consensus by the DSB, both the establishment of Panels and the adoption of Panels Reports and Appellate Body Reports are made automatically. This rule functions to deny the actual right of "veto" of one party of the disputes to the establishment of Panels and the adoption of Reports by Panels and the Appellate Body. Consequently, Panel procedures under the new WTO regime have had more

juridical nature and characteristic. This tendency has been reinforced by the creation of the new Appellate Body as a kind of "Appeal Court" among these procedures.

As a result, the new dispute settlement procedures under the WTO regime have been widely used not only by industrialized countries like the United States, the European Community and Japan, but also many developing countries. This is one of the remarkable developments under the WTO regime that would strengthen the real "universal" character of the new WTO. Now, in fact, the WTO has more than 130 members including not only all of major industrialized countries but also quite a number of developing countries, and some important non-member countries like China are also applying to join the WTO, and probably they will become members in near future.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this article, I have examined the development of legal regime of the GATT and WTO, and the structure and function of the WTO at the moment and especially the new dispute settlement procedures under the present WTO regime.

The more and more the world becomes interdependent in the areas of economy and trade, the role of this new organization would become greater and greater. Only after several years from its birth, the WTO has already become one of the most important international organizations around the world. Its rules and good functioning are one of the most essential factors for satisfactory operation of world trade, world market and global economy. In these days, probably any country, or any individual, cannot live without having any relationship with global network of world economy and world trade. The WTO will, without doubt, make a vital role on international trade and global economy for the next several decades, and through such function it will indirectly contribute to the maintaining international peace and security. We could learn from the history that the crisis and chaos in the area of trade and economy in the world had often led to the crisis for international peace and security. In that sense, the success of the WTO in future will be vital not only to world trade, but also to our future in international society as a whole.

EDITOR'S NOTE

1. U. N. ECOSOC Res.13, U.N.Doc.E/22 (1946). John H. Jackson, William J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, Third Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1995, p. 294.

2. "Specialized Agencies" of the United Nations are defined in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. There are 16 Specialized Agencies at the moment.

3. These four international organizations (IMF, IBRD, IFC and IDA) have the status of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. As the international organizations of the World Bank group, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, established in 1967) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, established in 1988) should be also included.

4. Olivier Long, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM, Graham & Trotman / Martinus Nijhoff, London / Dordrecht / Boston, 1987, pp. 8–11.

5. In 1964, contracting parties of the GATT adopted Part 4 of the GATT Agreement, with the title "Trade and Development". Paragraph 8 of Article 38 in this Part W provided the non-reciprocity on the part of "less developed contracting parties".

6. Jackson, Davey and Sykes, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 684.

7. Long, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

8. Paragraph 3 of Article 16 provided that contracting parties should, in principle, seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products, and Paragraph 4 of the same Article provided that contracting parties should seek to cease grant of any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than primary products "as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter". However, a lot of important exceptions were admitted to these provisions, and it could hardly assert that government subsidies have been substantially prohibited under the GATT regime.

9. Jackson, Davey and Sykes, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 757.

10. The most important agreement in this area was "Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Article 6, 16 and 23 of the General Agreement" adopted in Geneva on 12 April 1979, as a result of the Tokyo Round, which was usually known as the Subsidies Code or the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.

11. In the details of these eight Rounds, see Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 12–20 and John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1998, pp. 20–22.

12. Under the domestic legal system of the United States, the WTO Agreement is not regarded as "self-executing treaty", and, consequently, not directly applicable within the U.S. territories. Therefore, for the purpose of the domestic implementation of the WTO Agreement, the US Uruguay Round Implementing Act was enacted in December 1994. See Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–32.

13. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

14. This "negative consensus" rule is provided in Paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Establishment of Panels), Paragraph 4 of Article 16 (Adoption of Panel Reports) and Paragraph 14 of Article 17 (Adoption of Appellate Body Reports) in the DSU of the WTO.

STRESZCZENIE

GATT (Ogólne Porozumienie w Sprawach Taryf i Handlu) zostało ustanowione w 1947 roku jako porozumienie tymczasowe. Układ GATT zawierał kilka zasad regulujących stosunki handlowe pomiędzy stronami, wśród których zaznaczyć należy następujące: 1) zasadę niedyskryminacji, 2) zasadę eliminacji ograniczeń ilościowych, 3) zasadę regulacji praktyk dumpingowych oraz subsydiowania. Jednakże, począwszy od 1980 roku, system GATT stawał się coraz bardziej skomplikowany i nieskuteczny. W wielu państwach dojrzewała myśl o potrzebie radykalnych reform systemu. Zmiany były zatem konieczne. W rezultacie negocjacji międzynarodowych, prowadzonych

w ramach Rundy Urugwajskiej, podpisane zostało porozumienie z Marakeszu, stanowiące podstawy funkcjonowania systemu WTO (Światowej Organizacji Handlu). Od stycznia 1995 roku system GATT został zatem przekształcony w system WTO. Ten ostatni jest systemem bardziej szczegółowym i lepiej zorganizowanym niż GATT, między innymi dotyczy to skuteczności nowych procedur rozwiązywania sporów. Aktualnie wiele ważnych sporów między głównymi członkami organizacji – wliczając w to USA, Unię Europejską oraz Japonię – podlega tej nowej procedurze, której skuteczność wywołuje istotne efekty polityczne. W zglobalizowanym XXI wieku rola WTO stanie się jeszcze bardziej ważna dla każdego państwa uczestniczącego w światowej wymianie handlowej.